Belated claims for ACP/MACP benefits are barred by limitation and res judicata.

The applicants were Processing Workers or casual workers under the National Institute of Fisheries Post-Harvest Technology & Training. They were initially engaged between 1985 and 1989 and were subsequently regularised at different dates.

They claimed that their initial service, rather than merely their regular service, should be counted for grant of financial upgradations under the Assured Career Progression (“ACP”) and Modified Assured Career Progression (“MACP”) Schemes.

The applicants also contended that Processing Workers constituted a stand-alone category and that, under paragraph 32 of the Office Memorandum dated 10 February 2000, their ACP/MACP benefits ought to have been fixed by comparison with analogous posts such as Peons, Lower Division Clerks, Upper Division Clerks and Head Clerks.

The respondents maintained that only regular service could be counted under the ACP/MACP Schemes; that three grades of Processing Workers had been created pursuant to earlier litigation; and that the applicants had received the benefits applicable to their cadre.

They further argued that the applications were barred by limitation and by res judicata/constructive res judicata because the applicants had previously sought retrospective regularisation and consequential ACP/MACP benefits in O.A. No. 1124 of 2011.

1. Whether the Original Applications were maintainable, or were barred by limitation and by the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata?

2. Whether the applicants were entitled to have their initial casual, temporary-status or ad hoc service counted, instead of only their regular service, for the purpose of ACP/MACP financial upgradations?

3. Whether the applicants were entitled to ACP/MACP benefits by treating Processing Workers as a stand-alone post and granting them the scales applicable to Peons, LDCs, UDCs or Head Clerks under paragraph 32 of the Office Memorandum dated 10 February 2000?

4. Whether the impugned orders granting ACP/MACP benefits required to be quashed or modified?

The Tribunal applied Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, holding that an Original Application must be filed within the prescribed limitation period and that a belated representation cannot revive or postpone an accrued cause of action, except in cases involving a genuine continuing wrong.

It applied Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including Explanation IV concerning constructive res judicata, to hold that matters which could and should have been raised in earlier proceedings between the same parties cannot be litigated subsequently.

Under the ACP and MACP Schemes, financial upgradation is based on regular service, and casual, ad hoc, contractual or temporary-status service does not qualify unless the governing scheme or regularisation order expressly provides otherwise.

Relying on Punjab State Electricity Board v. Jagjiwan Ram, (2009) 3 SCC 661, the Tribunal held that service rendered in a non-regular establishment cannot ordinarily be clubbed with regular service for financial benefits.

Relying on Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 KHC 6393, it held that limitation cannot be circumvented through a highly belated representation.

Under Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 579, ACP/MACP benefits are incentive-based financial upgradations and are effective only from the dates prescribed under the relevant schemes, not automatically from 1 January 2006.

The Tribunal first held that the claims were substantially stale. The applicants’ ACP orders had been issued as early as 2001 and their MACP orders in 2008–2009, whereas the present applications were filed only in 2019.

The alleged representations made in November 2018 did not extend limitation because a belated representation cannot revive a cause of action that had already accrued years earlier.

The claims were also barred by constructive res judicata: in O.A. No. 1124 of 2011, the same applicants had sought retrospective regularisation from the date of initial engagement and consequential ACP/MACP benefits.

That claim had been rejected, and the applicants ought to have raised all connected objections concerning their financial upgradations in that proceeding.

On the merits, the Tribunal held that the ACP/MACP Schemes contemplated regular service and excluded casual, ad hoc and temporary-status service. Consequently, the applicants’ service could be counted only from the respective dates of regularisation.

The Tribunal further found that the creation of three grades of Processing Workers—Grade III in Rs. 2550–3200, Grade II in Rs. 2610–3540 and Grade I in Rs. 2750–4400—provided a cadre structure for applying the ACP scheme.

Since the applicants were drawing the Grade III scale, their first ACP to the Grade II scale of Rs. 2610–3540 was consistent with the applicable scheme.

There was no legal basis for equating Processing Workers with Peons or for granting them the LDC, UDC or Head Clerk scales merely because those posts carried higher scales.

The Tribunal also rejected the claim that MACP benefits should operate from 1 January 2006, holding that the scheme operated from its prescribed effective date, namely 1 September 2008.

The applicants were not entitled to count their pre-regularisation casual, ad hoc or temporary-status service for ACP/MACP purposes, nor were they entitled to parity with Peons, LDCs, UDCs or Head Clerks under paragraph 32 of the Office Memorandum dated 10 February 2000.

The ACP/MACP benefits granted on the basis of regular service and the Processing Worker grade structure were upheld.

Both Original Applications were dismissed, with no order as to costs.