Belated correction of date of birth at service’s fag end is impermissible absent exceptional justification.

The petitioner was appointed as a Fitter/Helper on 01.09.1975. His date of birth was recorded in the respondents’ service records as 01.07.1956. He claimed that his correct date of birth was 10.05.1960, relying principally on his primary-school records, transfer certificate, admission register and life-insurance policy.

The respondents informed him on 27.01.2016 that he would attain superannuation and retire with effect from 30.06.2016 on the basis of the recorded date of birth. His representation seeking correction was rejected on 12.02.2016, and he was subsequently retired by order dated 10.06.2016 with effect from 01.07.2016.

The petitioner challenged the rejection and retirement orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking correction of his date of birth, continuation in service until 2020, and consequential service benefits.

The respondents opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner had countersigned service documents reflecting 01.07.1956 and had raised the claim only at the fag end of his service.

Whether the petitioner could seek correction of his date of birth in the service record after more than four decades of service and at the fag end of his employment?

Whether the respondents’ rejection of the petitioner’s representation dated 12.02.2016 and his consequential retirement order dated 10.06.2016 warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution and the settled principle that correction of date of birth in service records cannot be claimed as a matter of right, particularly at or near superannuation, where the recorded date has remained unquestioned for a substantial period.

Relying on State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664, and Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 162, the Court held that belated claims must be rejected unless supported by irrefutable evidence, made in accordance with the applicable procedure, and shown to have caused real injustice.

The Court also relied on Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 411, G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shib Kumar Dushad, (2000) 8 SCC 696, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Pranab Kumar Layek, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2131, Employer in relation to Management of Katras Area of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Workman-Shahdeo Das, Civil Appeal No. 2776 of 2025, and General Manager, Barsua Iron Ore Mines v. Vice President, United Mines Mazdoor Union, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 491, which reiterate that long delay and a claim raised only to extend service tenure ordinarily defeat correction of the recorded date of birth.

The Court found that the petitioner had served for more than four decades with 01.07.1956 consistently recorded as his date of birth and had never challenged that entry during his service.

The respondents’ records, including documents in Annexures R/1 to R/5, had been countersigned by the petitioner and further demonstrated his knowledge and acceptance of the recorded date.

Although the school records and transfer certificate reflected a different date, the Court held that such documents could not overcome the extraordinary delay or justify reopening a settled service record at the stage when correction would extend the petitioner’s service by several years.

Applying the rule against entertaining belated date-of-birth claims, the Court concluded that the respondents’ decision disclosed no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of law warranting writ interference.

It upheld the order dated 12.02.2016 rejecting correction of his date of birth and the consequential retirement order dated 10.06.2016, effective from 01.07.2016.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was denied continuation in service up to 2020 and all consequential benefits.