Belated fence-sitters cannot claim extension of benefits granted by an in-personam judgment.

The petitioner was initially appointed as Junior Inspector of Cooperative Societies on 16 December 1985 under Rule 10(a)(i).

He claimed that he was selected in a Special Qualifying Examination held on 15 October 1989, but his result was withheld by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.

Consequently, he remained out of employment from 10 October 1990 until his re-induction in 2007.

The Commission declared his result by order dated 18 October 2007, recommended regularisation of his temporary/retrenched service, and fixed his seniority as 291-A.

The petitioner relied on the benefit granted to a similarly placed employee, K. Mariappan, pursuant to an order in W.P. No. 31840 of 2013 and subsequent G.O.(Ms.) No. 131 dated 09 November 2019, which extended benefits under G.O.Ms. No. 324 dated 09 December 1997.

The Government rejected the petitioner’s claim by G.O.(2D) No. 21 dated 20 April 2022, referring, inter alia, to the Supreme Court’s decision in Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.

Whether the petitioner could claim regularisation and consequential service and pensionary benefits by relying on the relief granted to the similarly placed employee, K. Mariappan.

Whether the petitioner’s claim was liable to be rejected on the grounds of delay, laches, acquiescence, and his status as a “fence-sitter,” having challenged the non-regularisation only after the benefit was granted to Mariappan.

Whether the Government’s rejection of the petitioner’s claim in G.O.(2D) No. 21 dated 20 April 2022 was legally unsustainable.

The Court considered Article 14 principles governing equal treatment of similarly situated employees, while recognising that such equality is subject to the doctrines of delay, laches, and acquiescence.

Relying on State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, the Court held that employees who acquiesce in an adverse action and approach the Court only after similarly placed employees obtain relief may be treated as “fence-sitters,” and their claims may be dismissed on delay and laches grounds.

The Court further applied the distinction between judgments in rem and judgments in personam: the benefit of a judgment in rem, particularly one concerning a general regularisation scheme or policy, may extend to all similarly situated persons, whereas a judgment in personam does not automatically confer such a right on non-parties absent a claim free from laches and acquiescence.

The respondents also relied on Section 17 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016, concerning the non-counting of part-time service, and on Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 764, in opposing the claim.

The Court found that the petitioner had been out of employment from 1990 to 2007 and had accepted his re-induction without immediately objecting to the non-recognition of his past service.

Although he was re-appointed in 2007, he challenged the denial of regularisation only around 2020, nearly 23 years after his ouster and approximately 10 years after his re-induction, and only after Mariappan obtained favourable relief.

Applying Arvind Kumar Srivastava, the Court held that the petitioner had remained dormant and sought to take advantage of another employee’s success; he was therefore a fence-sitter whose claim was barred by delay, laches, and acquiescence.

The Court also held that the relief granted to Mariappan arose from a judgment in personam and did not constitute a judgment in rem requiring automatic extension of benefits to the petitioner.

Accordingly, the Government’s refusal to extend the same relaxation to the petitioner did not disclose perversity or legal error.

It held that he could not claim regularisation, retrospective service benefits, or pensionary benefits as a matter of right merely because similar relief had been granted to Mariappan.

His belated challenge was defeated by delay, laches, acquiescence, and the fact that he sought relief based on a judgment in personam.

The writ petition challenging G.O.(2D) No. 21 dated 20 April 2022 was dismissed, with no order as to costs; the connected miscellaneous petition was also closed.