Blacklisting without conclusive proof of deliberate fraud is disproportionate and legally unsustainable.

The petitioners were successful bidders for several water supply projects under the "Jal Jeevan Mission".

After work orders were issued, Respondent authorities alleged that the petitioners had submitted a fake technical experience certificate purportedly issued by the Municipal Council, Karad (Maharashtra).

A verification email from the Municipal Council confirmed that no such certificate was issued.

Consequently, the Apex Committee cancelled the contracts and blacklisted the petitioners for three years via a decision dated 02.12.2025.

The petitioners challenged this, contending that major work (~70%) was completed, the certificate was genuine (relying on a contradictory letter dated 17.10.2024), and the blacklisting was disproportionate since they had relied on the document in good faith from a joint venture partner.

1. Whether the termination of the contracts was legally justified due to the submission of a doubtful experience certificate.

2. Whether the imposition of a three-year blacklisting period was proportionate and valid in the absence of a conclusive finding of deliberate fraud by the petitioners.

3. Whether contractual disputes regarding measurements and payments can be adjudicated under Article 226.

The Court applied the doctrine that submission of false information or forged documents in tender processes strikes at the root of the bidding process and justifies cancellation of the contract.

Regarding blacklisting, the Court relied on the principles of "fairness, proportionality, and reasoned decision-making."

It heavily cited *Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi)* (2014) 9 SCC 105, which characterizes blacklisting as "civil death".

It heavily cited *UMC Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India* (2021) 2 SCC 551, which emphasizes the requirement for a particularized finding of gravamen before stigmatizing an entity.

The Court reasoned that while the respondents were right to protect the sanctity of public procurement by cancelling the contract once the eligibility certificate was denied by the issuing authority, the further penalty of blacklisting failed the test of proportionality.

The Court observed that the respondents did not record a definitive finding of *mens rea* or intentional fraud personally attributable to the petitioners, especially since the certificate's status remained a matter of criminal investigation with contradictory reports.

The Court held that termination was sufficient to neutralize any unfair advantage, and blacklisting without proving conscious misrepresentation was an excessive administrative action.

As for the 70% completion claim and payment dues, the Court determined these were factual/contractual disputes governed by the arbitration clause (Clause 29) and not suitable for writ jurisdiction.

It upheld the respondents' authority to annul the contracts and re-tender the work.

However, it quashed and set aside the three-year blacklisting order, finding it disproportionate.

The Court directed that for all other contractual grievances (dues, measurements, remaining work), the petitioners are at liberty to approach a Civil Court or invoke the dispute-resolution mechanism provided in the agreement.