Bombay HC Dismisses Builder’s Section 6 Possession Suit: June Trespass Discovery Didn’t Establish When It Was Dispossessed

Respondent No. 1 filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking possession of Room No. 3, claiming that it had kept the premises locked and that the defendants forcibly entered them.

The plaint alleged that the plaintiff learned of the trespass in June 2012, but did not plead a specific date of dispossession; the suit was filed in October 2012.

The defendants did not file a written statement, although the plaintiff’s witness was cross-examined on their behalf.

The trial court decreed possession and directed an inquiry into mesne profits.

Defendant No. 2 challenged that decree under Section 115 CPC.

Section 6(1) of the Specific Relief Act permits a person dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law to recover possession, notwithstanding a competing title; under Section 6(2)(a), the suit must be brought within six months from the date of dispossession, and Section 6(3) bars an appeal from the order or decree.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act makes dismissal of a time-barred suit obligatory, even where limitation has not been pleaded.

The court relied on Sanjay Kumar Pandey v. Gulbahar Sheikh for the availability of revision in a Section 6 matter where no appeal lies.

The court relied on Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana for the proposition that failure to file a written statement does not relieve the plaintiff of proving its case.

It also applied the principle that a Section 6 claim turns on prior possession and dispossession, while questions of title may be pursued in a separate suit.

The plaint stated only that the plaintiff learned of the alleged trespass in June 2012; it neither used the term “dispossessed” in the relevant averments nor specified when dispossession occurred.

The court held that the date of knowledge could not, without more, be treated as the date of dispossession for calculating the six-month period.

Because the plaintiff had chosen the summary remedy under Section 6, it was required to plead and prove the facts establishing dispossession within the statutory period; the absence of a written statement did not cure that deficiency.

The trial court’s contrary approach was therefore a jurisdictional error warranting revision under Section 115 CPC.

The court clarified that the plaintiff could pursue any title-based claim in a separate suit.