Bona fide delay attributable partly to Registry scrutiny constitutes sufficient cause for condonation.

The appellant challenged the order dated 3 February 2025 by which the learned Single Judge allowed the respondents’ application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), and returned the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction, with liberty to present it before the competent court.

The appeal was filed on 8 March 2025, four days beyond the prescribed limitation period under Article 117 of the Limitation Act, 1963; the appellant therefore sought condonation of the four-day delay.

After filing, the Registry raised several objections, including defects relating to court fees, indexing, translation of vernacular documents, classification of the appeal, legibility of annexures, and service upon the caveator.

The appeal was ultimately accepted by the Registry on 23 September 2025, resulting in a claimed delay of 163 days in re-filing.

Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of the four-day delay in filing the appeal?

Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the 163-day delay in re-filing the appeal, particularly in view of the Registry’s objections, change of counsel, and repeated scrutiny?

Whether the appeal should be admitted and proceeded with after condonation of the filing and re-filing delays?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant establishes “sufficient cause” for the delay.

It relied on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107, which requires a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to delay, while rejecting a pedantic insistence that every day’s delay be explained with mathematical precision.

The Court also relied on Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 636, for the principle that curable procedural defects ordinarily should not defeat substantive rights; a filing should be treated as non-est only where the defects, considered cumulatively, demonstrate mala fide intent and absence of a genuine intention to prosecute the matter.

The Court further referred to Article 117 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a 30-day limitation period for an intra-court appeal from a judgment or order of a Single Judge of the High Court, and Delhi High Court Rules, Volume V, Chapter I, Part A, Rule 5, which permits reasonable time for removal of Registry defects and re-filing.

The Court held that the four-day delay in filing was satisfactorily explained by the time required to compile and organise the voluminous record of the underlying suit.

Given the short duration of the delay and the absence of any indication of mala fides, a liberal and pragmatic approach was warranted.

As to the 163-day re-filing delay, the Court found that the delay was not attributable entirely to the appellant.

The appeal underwent six rounds of scrutiny, and the Registry raised certain objections piecemeal, including translation, caveat-service, and indexing defects that could have been identified earlier.

The change of counsel, undertaken after the previous counsel failed to address the objections within a reasonable time, supported the appellant’s bona fides rather than indicating an intention to delay the proceedings.

The Court also found that 48 days of the delay were attributable to the Registry’s handling of the scrutiny process, including the delayed reporting of objections.

Although the appellant could have acted more promptly at certain stages, the Court concluded that the delay resulted from circumstances partly beyond its control and that denying the appeal on such procedural grounds would unjustly defeat the appellant’s right to appellate consideration.

Applications CM APPL. 61130/2025 and CM APPL. 61131/2025 were accordingly allowed, and both delays were condoned.

The appeal under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, read with Order XLIII Rule 1 and Section 151 CPC, was admitted; the digital record of the Single Judge was requisitioned, and the matter was directed to be listed on 30 November 2026.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not examined the merits of the challenge to the return of the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction at this stage.