Bona fide enforcement of society security protocols does not constitute wrongful restraint.

Respondent No. 2, an employee of Vinay Gupta, alleged that society members and staff obstructed him and three plumbers from entering the Om Shiv Darshan Co-operative Housing Society to install a water connection on 15 January and 5 March 2022.

The FIR, registered on 7 March 2022, invoked Sections 341 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC); a chargesheet was subsequently filed.

The petitioners sought quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), contending that the obstruction arose from security protocols and a pre-existing dispute between the society and Gupta.

The Court had stayed further proceedings and heard the petition finally.

1. Whether the FIR and accompanying material, taken at face value, disclosed the offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341 IPC.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its powers under Article 226 and Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and resulting prosecution as an abuse of process.

Section 339 IPC defines wrongful restraint as voluntarily obstructing a person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in a direction in which they have a right to proceed; its exception excludes an obstruction of a private way over land or water where the obstructing person, in good faith, believes they have a lawful right to obstruct it.

Section 341 IPC prescribes punishment for wrongful restraint, while Section 149 IPC concerns liability for acts committed by members of an unlawful assembly.

Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC empower the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court noted that quashing may be appropriate where the allegations, accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an offence, are inherently improbable, or the proceeding is manifestly attended by mala fides.

The Court considered that the society had complained to the police on the day of the first alleged incident, describing the entrants as unknown persons who had not complied with the society’s security procedures; the FIR was registered later and also alleged a second incident.

The Court found that the society had not been notified of the proposed work, that permission had not been obtained from it, and that the municipal permission required Gupta to contact the relevant junior engineer.

In the context of the parties’ wider disputes, the Court considered the petitioners’ actions to be bona fide performance of their security and society-related duties.

It concluded that the allegations did not establish that Respondent No. 2 had been prevented from proceeding in a direction in which he had a right to proceed, and that the prosecution appeared to convert a security-compliance dispute into a criminal case.

It therefore applied the Bhajan Lal categories concerning absence of a prima facie offence and proceedings allegedly attended by mala fides.

It allowed the petition under prayer clauses (a) and (aa), quashed the challenged FIR and resulting prosecution, and made the Rule absolute.