Breach of an undertaking not to execute empowers courts to restore possession under inherent jurisdiction.

The Estate Officer of Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port, Kolkata (“SPMPK”) passed an eviction order under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“1971 Act”) against M/s. Hada Brothers Private Limited on 30 January 2025.

The opposite party challenged the order before the District Judge, Howrah, in Misc. Appeal No. 23 of 2025.

The appeal was admitted, and an application for stay was filed.

During the hearing of the stay application, SPMPK undertook that execution would not be proceeded with “at this stage” and sought early hearing of the appeal.

Relying on the undertaking, the appellate court did not grant a formal stay.

On 1 July 2026, SPMPK took possession of the property.

The opposite party thereafter applied under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) for restoration of possession.

The appellate court allowed the application and directed SPMPK to restore possession.

SPMPK challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The High Court dismissed the revision.

Whether the appeal against the Estate Officer’s eviction order was a time-barred or “dead” appeal so as to disentitle the appellate court from granting restoration of possession.

Whether SPMPK’s undertaking not to proceed with execution “at this stage” continued during the pendency of the appeal.

Whether SPMPK’s forcible taking of possession during the pendency of the appeal constituted a breach of its undertaking and an abuse of the process of law.

Whether the appellate court was entitled to direct restoration of possession in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 CPC.

Section 9(1) of the 1971 Act provides an appeal against an order under Section 5, while Section 9(2)(a) prescribes a 12-day limitation period from publication of the eviction order.

The High Court held that the appellate court’s finding that the appeal was filed in time was a factual finding which had not been challenged before the appellate court and could not ordinarily be reopened for the first time under Article 227.

An undertaking given to a court, on the faith of which the court adopts a particular course, binds the party giving it; breach of such undertaking amounts to misconduct and disobedience requiring the court to restore the status quo ante, as recognised in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622, and Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai, (2023) 17 SCC 545.

The expression “at this stage” must be interpreted contextually, and, where the undertaking was given to avoid delay in deciding a stay application and was coupled with a request for early hearing, it extended through the pendency of the appeal.

Under Section 151 CPC, the court possesses inherent power—and, in appropriate cases, a duty—to undo an act done in breach of an injunction, stay, or undertaking and to restore possession, as recognised in Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Cal 220, Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah, AIR 1975 Mad 270, and Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.

The principle in Sri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, (1976) 1 SCC 311, that an admission made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress may not bind its maker, was inapplicable because no such circumstances were established.

The High Court declined to entertain SPMPK’s limitation objection because the appellate court had expressly recorded that the appeal was filed in time, the appeal had been admitted, and SPMPK had not challenged that finding or raised the objection before the appellate court until the restoration order was passed.

In interpreting the undertaking, the Court considered its context: SPMPK sought early disposal of the appeal while the opposite party’s stay application was pending, and the appellate court refrained from granting a formal stay because of SPMPK’s assurance that execution would not proceed.

Accordingly, “at this stage” referred to the period from the undertaking until disposal of the appeal, not merely to the date of the stay hearing.

SPMPK’s subsequent forcible taking of possession on 1 July 2026 therefore breached the undertaking and undermined the basis on which the appellate court had proceeded without issuing a formal stay.

Since SPMPK had not established before the appellate court that possession was taken solely because the interim order in the separate title suit had ended, it could not introduce that factual justification for the first time under Article 227.

The appellate court was consequently justified in exercising Section 151 CPC powers to restore the status quo ante.

SPMPK’s undertaking not to proceed with execution continued during the pendency of the appeal.

SPMPK’s forcible taking of possession violated that undertaking and constituted an abuse of the process of law.

The order directing restoration of possession under Section 151 CPC was upheld.

C.O. No. 2552 of 2026 was dismissed without any order as to costs.