Bus driver following conductor’s signals cannot be held criminally negligent under Section 304A IPC.

The appellant, a driver for the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), was convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 134 r/w 187 of the MV Act

On April 17, 2011, while a passenger (the deceased) was alighting from the bus, the appellant moved the vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain fatal head injuries

The Trial Court and Appellate Court upheld the conviction, finding the act of starting the vehicle before a passenger safely disembarked constituted rash and negligent driving

The High Court partially modified the sentence by applying the doctrine of merger, setting aside the sentence under Section 279 but maintaining the six-month imprisonment under Section 304A IPC

1. Whether the act of moving a bus based on the conductor’s signal (whistle) constitutes "criminal negligence" or "rashness" on the part of the driver under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC

2. Whether the appellant exercised the due care demanded by the circumstances to exclude the application of "culpable negligence"

The Court applied Section 279 IPC (rash driving) and Section 304A IPC (causing death by negligence)

It relied on the principles of negligence defined in Halsbury's Laws of England as the failure to exercise care demanded by specific circumstances

The court emphasized the distinction between "culpable rashness" and "culpable negligence" as established in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, noting that criminality arises from a "deliberation in mind" to risk life

Furthermore, it applied the principle from State of Karnataka v. Satish, holding that negligence is a relative term and cannot be presumed merely from the occurrence of an accident

The Court analyzed the testimony of PW6 (the bus conductor), who admitted that he signaled the driver to stop, saw passengers alight, and then whistled for the driver to move the bus

The Court reasoned that in a passenger bus, the driver is duty-bound to follow the conductor’s signals to regulate movement while focusing on the road ahead

The Court held that the driver's dependence on the conductor's whistle was a "normal and natural conduct" and did not constitute an omission of due care

The Court found that the appellant lacked the "culpable rashness" or "recklessness" required for a conviction because his actions were preceded by the thoughtfulness of heeding the conductor’s instructions

Applying "common sense" to the evidence, the Court determined that the deceased might have slipped due to her own lack of care, and the driver could not be held criminally liable for following established safety protocols

The Court concluded that the lower courts and the High Court committed a manifest error in overlooking the conductor’s role in the movement of the vehicle. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant of all charges