Cessation of a Pradhan’s tenure does not extinguish liability or Section 95(1)(g) proceedings.

The petitioner filed a public interest litigation seeking action against the village Pradhan (respondent no. 9) and other officials for alleged embezzlement and misappropriation of Gram Panchayat funds, including transfer of approximately ₹11,83,000 towards labour wages into the bank account of the Pradhan’s son.

An initial inquiry by the District Panchayat Raj Officer identified eight discrepancies and recommended registration of an FIR against the concerned respondents, but a subsequent inquiry found no wrongdoing; the High Court characterised the latter report as a “made up document” intended to rectify defects identified in the earlier report.

The Court consequently directed a fresh inquiry by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer.

The subsequent inquiry found wrongdoing by the Gram Pradhan and Gram Vikas Adhikari, leading to show-cause notices and initiation of proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.

An earlier order against the Pradhan under Section 95(1)(g) was quashed by the High Court in Writ-C No. 25303 of 2025, with liberty to pass a fresh order.

A fresh order dated 8 July 2026 seized the Pradhan’s financial and administrative powers and appointed an Administrator.

In Writ-C No. 28087 of 2026, the Court observed that the Pradhan’s tenure had ended and that the seizure order had consequently become of “no legal consequence,” while permitting her to raise all legally permissible objections in the pending inquiry.

The petitioner nevertheless contended that no effective action had been taken and that the misappropriated amount had not been recovered.

The State submitted that the inquiry pursuant to the order dated 8 July 2026 remained pending.

Whether the proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 could continue despite the expiry of the Pradhan’s tenure and the consequent cessation of her financial and administrative powers

Whether the respondents were required to conclude the pending inquiry into the alleged financial misconduct and wrongdoing of the Pradhan in accordance with law

Whether the Pradhan’s cessation from office eliminated or otherwise extinguished her liability for loss, waste or misapplication of Gram Panchayat funds during her tenure

The Court applied Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, which authorises action, including removal and cessation of powers, against a Pradhan for statutory misconduct and financial wrongdoing.

Section 95(2) provides that a person removed under the relevant clauses of Section 95(1)(g) is disqualified from being re-elected or re-appointed to any office under the Act for five years, or such lesser period as the State Government may direct.

Section 27 imposes surcharge liability on a Pradhan for loss, waste or misapplication of Gram Panchayat money or property resulting directly from neglect or misconduct; such liability continues for the statutory period even after the person ceases to hold office, and the amount may be recovered as arrears of land revenue.

The Court therefore held that expiry of tenure or appointment of an Administrator does not extinguish past financial liability or render proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) infructuous.

The Court distinguished between the practical effect of the order dated 8 July 2026—namely, seizure of the Pradhan’s financial and administrative powers after expiry of her tenure—and the continuing legal effect of the inquiry initiated under Section 95(1)(g).

Although the Pradhan’s tenure had ended, Section 95(2) contemplated continuing consequences of removal, including disqualification from future office, while Section 27 independently preserved liability for financial loss or misapplication caused during the tenure.

Accordingly, the observation in the separate writ petition that the seizure order had become of “no legal consequence” did not terminate or invalidate the pending inquiry.

The Pradhan remained entitled to raise legally permissible factual and legal objections, but those objections had to be considered within the statutory inquiry and could not be treated as preventing the proceedings from continuing.

Given the findings of wrongdoing in successive inquiries and the pending proceedings, the Court held that the State authorities were required to take the matter to its logical conclusion.

The proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) were held to remain operative, subject to the Pradhan’s right to raise all legally permissible objections.

The PIL was accordingly disposed of with a direction to the respondents to conclude the pending inquiry against respondent no. 9, arising from the order dated 8 July 2026, in accordance with law within four months from 14 August 2026.