Childlessness and fertility-related difficulties alone do not constitute matrimonial cruelty warranting divorce.

The parties married on 18 June 2007 and had no children.

The husband sought divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging, among other things, humiliation, suspicion, refusal of matrimonial companionship, desertion and an assault on 4 June 2016.

The wife denied the allegations, attributed some disagreements to the husband’s drinking, and stated that she had undergone treatment for a uterine fibroid in the hope of conceiving.

The Family Court dismissed the husband’s petition, finding the alleged cruelty insufficiently proved. He appealed to the Madras High Court.

Whether the husband established that the wife had treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Whether the Family Court’s dismissal of the divorce petition warranted appellate interference.

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 permits divorce on the ground of cruelty.

The spouse alleging cruelty bears the burden of establishing it by acceptable evidence; cruelty must be assessed in light of the entire matrimonial relationship, but the underlying facts must first be proved.

Applying Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, the Court reiterated that there is no straitjacket formula for determining mental cruelty and that the cumulative effect of conduct is relevant, provided its factual foundation is established.

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage, by itself, is not a statutory ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia).

The Court found no basis to disturb the Family Court’s assessment that the alleged humiliation, assault, removal of the thali, and other acts had not been satisfactorily proved; the absence of corroboration, including the husband’s father not testifying to the alleged “impotent” insult, supported that conclusion.

The wife’s visits to Dindigul and questions about the husband’s late return did not, on the evidence, establish cruelty.

The parties’ childlessness and the wife’s medical treatment did not establish that she had wilfully refused matrimonial life; the Court viewed her treatment and stated willingness to reunite as inconsistent with an intention to abandon the marriage.

Separation alone could not supply the statutory ground of cruelty, and the Family Court’s findings disclosed no perversity or illegality warranting appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed, the Family Court’s judgment and decree were confirmed, and there was no order as to costs.