Claim petitions under Section 163A may be converted to Section 166 at any stage of proceedings.

The petitioners filed a claim petition (M.A.C.P. No. 1928 of 2009) following a fatal vehicular accident on November 13, 2009.

The petition was initially filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("the Act").

While the Tribunal initially allowed the claim, it exonerated the Insurance Company from liability.

Upon appeal (First Appeal No. 2089 of 2012), the High Court remanded the matter for fresh adjudication on January 27, 2025.

Following remand, the claimants moved an application (Exh. 72) to convert the petition from Section 163A to Section 166 of the Act.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nadiad, rejected this application on April 15, 2025, citing delay and the advanced stage of litigation.

The petitioners challenged this rejection via the captioned Special Civil Application.

The court primarily applied the statutory framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Sections 140, 163A, 163B, and 166.

Claimants possess multiple statutory remedies and may move for amendment/conversion of a claim petition at any stage of the proceedings (National Insurance Company Limited v. Mukeshbhai Bhalachandrabhai Jani (deceased) through heirs Ranjanben and ors. (2004 ACJ 1533)).

Section 163B provides the only statutory bar, prohibiting a person from claiming compensation under both Section 140 and Section 163A simultaneously.

The Court observed that the claimants are legally entitled to choose between the statutory remedies available under Sections 166, 140, and 163A of the Act.

Citing Mukeshbhai Bhalachandrabhai Jani, the Court emphasized that a claimant can move for amendment from Section 163A to Section 166 (or vice versa) at any stage, including the appellate stage, provided other statutory conditions are met.

The Court rejected the respondent Insurance Company’s arguments regarding "inordinate delay" and the "second round of litigation," holding that the Tribunal is duty-bound to consider such conversion applications in light of settled legal propositions.

Consequently, the Court found the Tribunal's refusal to allow the conversion to be legally unsustainable.

The Court held that claimants are permitted to convert their claim petition from Section 163A to Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, regardless of the stage of proceedings.

No order as to costs was made.