Claims challenging family-property transfers were time-barred when brought more than three years after majority.

The plaintiffs and Defendants 1–5 claimed descent from Lalsab, who had two wives.

The plaintiffs were children of his second wife; Defendants 1–5 were children of his first wife.

The plaintiffs alleged that the family properties remained undivided and challenged sales of certain properties to Defendants 6–8, asserting that the transfers could not bind their shares.

The Trial Court dismissed the partition suit, finding, among other things, that the plaintiffs had not established joint possession or their claimed shares, that the purchasers’ deeds were binding, and that the suit was time-barred.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal.

In the second appeal, the High Court admitted the matter on whether the courts below could dismiss the suit without working out equities among family members despite the asserted family relationship and source of title.

Whether the courts below were justified in dismissing the partition suit without working out equities among the family members, even if the properties had been sold to third-party purchasers.

Whether the concurrent findings dismissing the suit, including the finding that it was barred by limitation, disclosed an error warranting interference in a second appeal.

The appeal was governed by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which a second appeal lies for consideration of a substantial question of law.

The Court also referred to Article 60 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which it applied as requiring a suit to be brought within three years after attaining majority in the circumstances it considered relevant.

The judgment cited no precedent and stated no separate general doctrine governing the working out of equities among co-sharers.

The Court relied on the concurrent findings that the plaintiffs had failed to prove joint possession and entitlement to the claimed shares, and that the purchasers had established the relevant registered sale deeds.

It noted that the sales had occurred in 1955, 1975 and 1986, that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the deeds, and that the suit was brought much later; it therefore agreed with the courts below that the suit was time-barred, applying Article 60.

Given those findings, the Court held that there was no occasion to work out equities between the family members and purchasers.

It found no error in the concurrent judgments and concluded that answering the substantial question of law did not arise.

It also directed that any pending applications stand disposed of.