Closure of prosecution evidence is improper before securing vital medical and investigating witnesses.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 7 January 2026 of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Contai, in G.R. Case No. 83 of 2006 arising from Contai P.S. Case No. 28/06, concerning offences under Sections 323/324/506/34 of the IPC.

The Trial Court had closed the prosecution evidence on the prayer of the Assistant Public Prosecutor without examining two treating doctors and the Investigating Officer, identified as material witnesses/C.S.Ws. 10, 11 and 13.

The prosecution case was that the accused assaulted the victim with fists, blows, a lathi and a katan, causing injuries to various parts of his body; the victim had already deposed as P.W. 1, but the doctors and Investigating Officer had not been examined.

Warrants had been issued for securing the attendance of the witnesses, but the prosecution sought closure of evidence before execution of the warrants.

The case had remained pending since 2006, and an earlier coordinate Bench had directed that the doctors and Investigating Officer be examined before proceeding to examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

Whether the Trial Court was justified in closing the prosecution evidence without examining the two doctors and the Investigating Officer, whose evidence was material to establish and corroborate the injuries suffered by the victim.

Whether, notwithstanding the prolonged pendency of the case and the accused’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, the prosecution should be granted one final opportunity to produce the remaining material witnesses.

The Court applied Sections 323, 324, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which constituted the offences alleged in the prosecution case and included allegations of bodily injury.

It considered the procedural requirement that material prosecution witnesses, particularly treating doctors and the Investigating Officer, should be examined where their evidence is directly relevant to proving the nature of injuries, corroborating the victim’s testimony and enabling a proper adjudication.

The Court also applied the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial as an integral facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

It further recognised that, before closing evidence, the Trial Court should exhaust lawful processes, including summons and other coercive processes where necessary, to secure the attendance of essential witnesses.

The Court held that P.W. 1’s testimony alone did not eliminate the importance of the doctors’ evidence because the doctors had treated the victim and could corroborate the alleged injuries, while the Investigating Officer’s evidence was necessary for a complete determination of the case.

The earlier coordinate Bench had specifically directed that these witnesses be examined, yet they remained unexamined despite the passage of time.

Although the Court acknowledged the twenty-year pendency and the accused’s right to a speedy trial, it concluded that closure of evidence before execution of the warrants was inappropriate, particularly because the case substantially concerned the bodily injuries allegedly sustained by the victim.

The interests of justice therefore required one final, strictly time-bound opportunity to produce the material witnesses.

The Trial Court was directed to issue summons to the remaining material witnesses, secure their attendance on a day-to-day basis, and, if necessary, exhaust all lawful processes to ensure their examination, without granting unnecessary adjournments and keeping in view the prolonged pendency of the case.

CRR No. 1241 of 2026 was accordingly allowed and disposed of, and the connected application, CRAN No. 1 of 2026, was also disposed of.