Commencement of trial does not bar lawful transfer of a part-heard sessions case.

The petitioner-accused was facing trial for an offence under Section 302 of the IPC in Sessions Case No. 824 of 2013 before the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City.

The prosecution had examined PW-1 to PW-20, with the Investigating Officer as PW-20; however, on the date the impugned re-allocation took effect, the case was still at the stage of securing the presence and recording the evidence of PW-20.

By Notification dated 20 May 2026, issued under Sections 408 and 409 of the CrPC/Sections 448 and 449 of the BNSS, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge re-allocated police stations among different Sessions Courts and transferred the petitioner’s case from the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Court to the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Court.

The Notification permitted existing Courts to retain matters already posted for recording the accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC/Section 351 BNSS, final arguments, or reserved judgment.

The petitioner challenged the Notification and sought re-transfer of the case to the Court that had recorded the evidence, contending that transfer after commencement of trial violated Sections 326, 408 and 409 CrPC and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

Whether the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge had the statutory authority under Sections 408 and 409 CrPC/Sections 448 and 449 BNSS to transfer or re-allocate a part-heard Sessions case after commencement of evidence.

Whether the petitioner had a legal right to have the case continued and concluded by the Judge who had recorded the evidence, based on the principle that the Judge who hears must decide and the alleged prejudice caused by transfer.

Whether the impugned Notification was arbitrary, mala fide, selectively directed against the petitioner, or otherwise liable to be quashed in constitutional judicial review.

Section 365 BNSS, corresponding to Section 326 CrPC, permits a succeeding Judge to act upon evidence recorded by the predecessor and provides that, upon a lawful transfer, the former Judge is deemed to have ceased exercising jurisdiction and the transferee Judge to have succeeded him.

Section 448 BNSS, corresponding to Section 408 CrPC, empowers the Sessions Judge to transfer a case to another competent Criminal Court in the Sessions Division whenever such transfer is expedient in the interests of justice; the provision does not impose an express prohibition against transfer merely because the trial has commenced.

Section 449(2) BNSS, corresponding to Section 409(2) CrPC, restricts administrative recall of a case made over to an Additional Sessions Judge after commencement of trial, but that restriction does not necessarily control an independent transfer power under Section 448 BNSS/Section 408 CrPC.

In Nitinbhai Saevatilaal Shah v. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal, (2011) 9 SCC 638, the Supreme Court held that Section 326 CrPC is a statutory exception to the general rule that the Judge who records evidence should decide the case and that a successor may continue from the stage reached by the predecessor without a de novo trial.

The Court also relied on Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2016 SCC OnLine All 3352, which recognised the power to transfer a part-heard case under Section 408 CrPC and held that the accused has no right to insist on trial before a particular Judge.

Judicial review of administrative allocation of judicial business is limited to cases involving arbitrariness, mala fides, caprice, manifest unreasonableness, or legally demonstrable prejudice.

The Court held that the Notification’s transfer mechanism was legally sustainable because Section 448 BNSS/Section 408 CrPC contains no absolute statutory bar against transferring a case after evidence has commenced, while Section 365 BNSS/Section 326 CrPC expressly provides the mechanism by which the transferee Court may continue on the evidence already recorded.

The petitioner’s case had not reached any of the Notification’s protected stages—recording of the accused’s statement, final arguments, or reservation of judgment—because the evidence of PW-20 was still awaited when the transfer took effect.

Accordingly, the case fell within the general rule of re-allocation and not within the stated exceptions permitting retention by the original Court.

The Court rejected the argument that the original Judge’s observation of witness demeanour created an exclusive right to decide the case, holding that such a principle could not override the statutory scheme permitting succession and transfer.

It further found that the petitioner’s case was not selectively targeted but was transferred as part of a general police-station-wise re-allocation intended to distribute judicial work and facilitate administration.

No arbitrariness, mala fides, collateral purpose, or demonstrable prejudice was established.

It held that the impugned Notification dated 20 May 2026 was a valid administrative re-allocation, that the petitioner had no vested right to have the Sessions Case decided by the Judge who had recorded the earlier evidence, and that the transferee Court could proceed under Section 365 BNSS/Section 326 CrPC from the stage at which the case stood transferred.

The challenge to the Notification and the prayer for re-transfer of Sessions Case No. 824 of 2013 to the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Court were rejected.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.