Comparative assessment for promotion requires one-level ACR upgradation for officers shouldering higher responsibilities.

The Petitioner was appointed as General Manager (HR) [GM] in 2014 through an In-Basket Selection Process (IBSP).

Respondent No. 4 was promoted to the same post later, in 2019.

In 2022, a vacancy arose for the post of Chief General Manager (HR) [CGM], which requires two years of experience in the feeder category (GM).

Promotion is based on a benchmark score derived from Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of the preceding five years.

Initially, Administrative Circular No. 628 (2021) set the benchmark at 20 marks, but Circular No. 649 (2022) increased it to 21 marks to ensure uniformity across the trifurcated companies of the erstwhile MSEB.

The Petitioner secured 20 marks based on five years of service as GM.

Respondent No. 4 secured 25 marks; however, his assessment included two years (2017-2019) where he occupied the lower post of Deputy General Manager (DGM).

Respondent No. 4 was promoted on 30 November 2022, which the Petitioner challenged as arbitrary.

1. Whether the enhancement of the promotion benchmark from 20 to 21 marks via Administrative Circular No. 649 was arbitrary or specifically intended to favor Respondent No. 4.

2. Whether the comparative assessment of ACRs between an officer holding a higher feeder post for the entire block period and an officer holding a lower post for part of that period is legally sustainable.

The Court affirmed that the fixation of benchmarks for promotion is within the employer's exclusive domain and judicial review is limited.

It relied on P.S. Mahal v. Union of India, which held that comparative assessments are impossible when officers from different hierarchical streams meet for promotion using the same yardstick.

The Court further applied the "one-step higher grading" principle from the Full Bench of the CAT in S.S. Sambhus v. Union of India, which was approved by the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Union of India.

This doctrine stipulates that for the purpose of comparative merit, an officer who shouldered higher responsibilities during the assessment period is entitled to have their grading treated as one level higher (e.g., "Good" to "Very Good") than the actual award to ensure an equitable "apple-to-apple" comparison.

The Court rejected the allegation that the benchmark increase was fraudulent, finding it was a legitimate policy decision by the Holding Company for uniformity.

However, it found the comparative assessment between the candidates fundamentally flawed.

The Petitioner had served as GM for all five years of the assessment block, while Respondent No. 4's score included two years as DGM.

The Court reasoned that since the reporting and reviewing authorities are the same for both posts, comparing the performance of a GM with a DGM without adjustment is irrational and violative of Article 14.

Following the precedent in Shiv Kumar Sharma, the Court held that the Petitioner was entitled to have his ACRs for 2017-18 and 2018-19 upgraded by one level because he held the higher post of GM while the Respondent held a lower post.

This adjustment raised the Petitioner's score from 20 to 22 marks, thereby meeting the revised benchmark of 21 marks.

It held that an officer in a higher post must be graded one level higher than an officer in a lower post during comparative merit assessment.

Consequently, the Court set aside the promotion of Respondent No. 4 dated 30 November 2022.

It directed Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to promote the Petitioner to the post of CGM (HR) effective from 30 November 2022, with all consequential benefits.