Compassionate appointment is not a vested right and is barred by inordinate delay.

The appellant’s father, a Peon under the respondent authorities, died in harness on September 20, 1995

Upon attaining majority, the appellant applied for a compassionate appointment on August 22, 2006

Following a 2009 writ petition that granted him liberty to file a representation, the respondent authorities rejected his claim on June 21, 2019, citing a delay in filing the application

The appellant challenged this rejection in WP(S) No. 8497 of 2019, which the learned Single Judge dismissed on November 19, 2025

The present writ appeal was filed with a 35-day delay, which the Division Bench condoned, challenging the Single Judge’s order on the grounds that the 1994 Policy should have applied instead of the 2013 Policy

1. Whether the claim for compassionate appointment can be sustained after a prolonged delay from the date of the employee's death

2. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition by failing to apply the policy prevailing at the time of the employee's death

compassionate appointment is not a vested right or a regular source of employment, but a provision intended to provide immediate financial succor to a deceased employee's family in distress

the object of such schemes is to "keep the kitchen fire burning" rather than to create a windfall for the kin

State of M.P. v. Ashish Awasthi (2022) 2 SCC 157, which establishes that the policy prevailing on the date of death generally governs the claim

prolonged delay in claiming or deciding such appointments dilutes the sense of immediacy required for such relief

The court reasoned that the primary purpose of compassionate appointment is to mitigate immediate financial crises following the death of a breadwinner

In this case, the death occurred in 1995, the application was made in 2006 (11 years later), and the final rejection occurred in 2019

The court found that such a significant lapse of time defeats the very object of the scheme, as the family had managed to survive for over a decade without the appointment

It further observed that even if the 1994 policy were considered, the "sense of immediacy" was lost due to the prolonged delay

The Division Bench concluded that the learned Single Judge correctly identified that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right after a considerable period, and the delay in this instance was fatal to the appellant’s claim

The Court held that the rejection of the claim due to delay was justified because the immediate financial necessity required to trigger compassionate appointment no longer existed after the lapse of several years

No costs were awarded