Compensation claims involving disputed facts and quantum are ordinarily unsuitable for adjudication under writ jurisdiction.

The Appellant’s eighteen-year-old vehicle, bearing Registration No. MH 12 DP 3531, was seized by the Respondent on 2 December 2024 while parked on a public street, on the ground that it was an End-of-Life Vehicle under the Motor Vehicle (Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility) Rules, 2021 (“RVSF Rules”).

The Appellant contended that the vehicle had remained stationary and unused for approximately four years, and requested its release through emails dated 4, 9, 11 and 17 December 2024.

The Appellant thereafter filed W.P. (C) No. 681/2026 seeking release of the vehicle. That petition was disposed of on 28 March 2026 after the Respondent stated that the vehicle had already been scrapped; the Appellant was granted liberty to pursue appropriate proceedings for compensation.

The Appellant subsequently filed W.P. (C) No. 5558/2026 claiming Rs. 1,43,44,500 as compensation for mental agony, harassment, prolonged effort and the alleged unlawful seizure, detention and scrapping of the vehicle.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition, holding that the claim involved disputed questions of fact and quantification of loss, for which a civil suit was the appropriate remedy.

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in declining to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for awarding compensation arising from the seizure and scrapping of the Appellant’s vehicle?

Whether the claim involved disputed questions of fact and assessment of damages such that the Appellant’s appropriate remedy was a civil suit rather than a writ petition?

Whether the alleged seizure and scrapping, allegedly without notice or hearing, justified an award of public law compensation for violation of Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, recognising that a High Court may, in an appropriate case, award public law compensation for violation of fundamental rights, including under the constitutional-tort doctrine.

However, writ jurisdiction is discretionary and is not ordinarily exercised where adjudication requires examination of disputed facts, leading of evidence, or detailed assessment of damages; in such cases, the ordinary civil remedy is more appropriate.

The Court also applied the RVSF Rules, 2021 and the “Guidelines for Handling End of Life Vehicle in Public Place, 2024,” under which End-of-Life Vehicles found parked or plying in public places may be seized and handed over to a registered vehicle scrapping facility, subject to prescribed procedures for release and scrapping.

Clause 9 of the Guidelines permits scrapping where no release application is made within three weeks, where the release application is rejected, or in specified cases of repeated impounding.

The authorities cited by the Appellant—including Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das , (2000) 2 SCC 465—establish that public law compensation may be granted in suitable cases, but do not make such relief available as of right in every claim involving alleged State wrongdoing.

The Court held that the legality of the Respondent’s action had to be assessed against the statutory and procedural framework governing seizure, release and scrapping of End-of-Life Vehicles.

The Appellant had not shown that he availed himself of the release mechanism under the Guidelines, nor had he challenged the constitutional validity of the RVSF Rules or the Guidelines.

Determining whether the vehicle was lawfully seized, whether the Appellant failed to furnish the requisite undertaking, whether the Respondent complied with the prescribed procedure, and whether the Appellant suffered the claimed mental agony, reputational injury and other losses would require evidence and resolution of rival factual assertions.

The substantial compensation claim, which extended beyond the vehicle’s scrap value to alleged loss of an antique personal possession, reputational injury, punitive damages and other heads, also required proof and valuation unsuitable for summary determination in writ jurisdiction.

The fact that a civil suit may be time-consuming did not justify bypassing the ordinary remedy.

Although public law compensation under Article 226 is legally permissible in an appropriate constitutional-tort case, the present facts and the nature of the compensation claimed did not warrant its exercise.

The dismissal of W.P. (C) No. 5558/2026 was therefore affirmed; pending applications were disposed of and there was no order as to costs.