01Facts
Respondent No. 1, a Yoga Instructor at the Laxmi Bai National Institute of Physical Education (LNIPE), alleged sexual harassment by the Vice-Chancellor (Respondent No. 7). Despite multiple complaints to the police between 2019 and 2020, no FIR was registered
¶ 2–3She filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC, which the JMFC declined, instead treating it as a complaint under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC
¶ 4This was upheld by the High Court but eventually overturned by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1184/2022, which directed the police to register an FIR
¶ 5–6While this litigation was pending, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition seeking a safe working environment and action per the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) report
¶ 7–8On 15/07/2025, the Single Judge directed the State to pay ₹5 Lakh in compensation for the three-year delay/inaction in registering the FIR
¶ 1002Issues
i.1. Whether the Single Judge was justified in granting compensation against the State for police inaction when no such relief was prayed for in the writ petition
¶ 8–9, 15ii.2. Whether the police were guilty of "inaction" for three years given that the matter was pending adjudication before various judicial forums during that period
¶ 12, 1703Law Applied
Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 regarding writ appeals
¶ 1Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh regarding principles of criminal procedure for registration of FIRs
¶ 10Statutory framework of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
¶ 18Procedural principle that relief cannot generally be granted by a writ court if it was not specifically pleaded or sought by the petitioner in the pleadings
¶ 15–16Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 156Section 200Section 202
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 Section 15Section 2Section 3
04Reasoning
The Court observed that the writ petition, originally filed in February 2020 and amended in June 2021, contained no specific prayer for compensation against the police authorities. At the time of the amendment, the issue of FIR registration was sub-judice before the JMFC; hence, there was no occasion for the petitioner to seek such relief against the State
¶ 9, 15The police had promptly taken a decision not to register the FIR, which was subsequently litigated before the JMFC, the High Court, and the Supreme Court. Because the delay was attributable to the standard duration of judicial proceedings rather than administrative negligence or "inaction," the imposition of a penalty was deemed unwarranted
¶ 12, 1705Holding
The Court held that the direction to pay compensation was unsustainable as it was granted without a corresponding prayer in the writ petition and was based on a flawed premise of police "inaction" during a period of active judicial scrutiny
¶ 16–17The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the direction contained in paragraph 46 of the impugned order regarding the ₹5 Lakh compensation
¶ 19Original Court PDF
State Of Madhya PradeshvsSmt Anusha Deepak Tyagi
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