Complete acquittal constitutes full exoneration under FR 54(2), entitling the employee to full pay and allowances during suspension.

The respondent, a Junior Engineer with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, was arrested in a CBI corruption case under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and was placed under deemed suspension from 16 January 1996.

He was convicted by the Special Judge in January 2000 and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.

His appeal was allowed by the Delhi High Court on 29 November 2018, which found serious deficiencies and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence and acquitted him; the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to that decision.

While the criminal proceedings were pending, the respondent was dismissed from service on 13 March 2001 under Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution, without disciplinary proceedings.

Following his acquittal, he sought reinstatement and consequential benefits.

He was reinstated on 12 December 2019, but the Municipal Corporation did not initially decide his entitlement to pay and allowances for the periods of suspension and dismissal.

After successive proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal, the respondent’s claim was rejected by the Corporation on 16 February 2021.

The Tribunal subsequently directed payment of full pay and allowances for the suspension period and 50% pay and allowances for the period between dismissal and reinstatement.

The Municipal Corporation challenged that decision before the High Court.

The Court applied Fundamental Rule 54(2), which governs the treatment of the period of suspension or removal and the payment of pay and allowances upon reinstatement where the employee is fully exonerated.

The Court also considered Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution, under which the respondent had been dismissed on the basis of conduct leading to his conviction without a disciplinary inquiry.

Relying on Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175, the Court held that expressions such as “benefit of doubt” and “honourable acquittal” are not conclusive; the substance of the acquittal order must be examined to determine whether the accused was completely acquitted or only partly acquitted.

Under FR 54(2), the relevant test is whether the employee was “fully exonerated,” not whether the acquittal was labelled an “honourable acquittal”.

The High Court examined the criminal appellate judgment rather than relying merely on its use of the expression “benefit of doubt.”

The appellate court had identified serious deficiencies in the prosecution case, including the absence of reliable evidence of demand, contradictions regarding the trap proceedings, and the possibility that the money had been thrust into the respondent’s pocket; it consequently set aside the conviction and completely acquitted him.

Since the respondent’s dismissal was based solely on the conduct leading to his conviction and no independent disciplinary proceedings had been held, the acquittal meant that he was fully exonerated for the purposes of FR 54(2).

The Court therefore upheld the Tribunal’s direction for full pay and allowances during the suspension period.

It further observed that FR 54(2) could potentially justify full pay even for the post-dismissal period, but held that the Tribunal’s award of only 50% pay and allowances represented an equitable and unchallenged balancing of interests.

He was therefore entitled under FR 54(2) to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension from 16 January 1996 to 13 March 2001.

The Tribunal’s direction granting 50% of pay and allowances for the period from dismissal until reinstatement was also upheld.

The writ petition was dismissed and the Tribunal’s order was affirmed in its entirety.