### Completion of probationary period without a written confirmation order does not result in deemed confirmation.

The Appellants were employed by Respondent No. 1 (Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd) through a sequence of appointments: initially as trainees for one year, then as temporary workers for six months, and finally placed on probation for six months

Upon completion of the six-month probation period, the Respondent terminated their services via letters (or oral communication) stating their employment ended by efflux of time/completion of probation

The Appellants filed complaints under Section 28 of the MRTU & PULP Act, alleging unfair labour practices

The Labour Court ruled in favor of the Appellants, holding that Model Standing Order 4A prescribes a maximum probation of three months, making the six-month contract illegal and the termination an unfair labor practice

However, the Industrial Court in revision reversed this, holding the termination fell under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act

The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the subsequent Writ Petition

1. Whether the termination of the Appellants' services upon the expiry of the contractual probation period amounted to an unfair labour practice under Items 1(b) and (f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act

2. Whether Clause 4A of Schedule-I of the Model Standing Orders (prescribing a 3-month probation) results in "deemed confirmation" of a probationer in the absence of a written order of permanency

3. Whether Rule 32 of the Model Standing Orders allows a contract of service with a longer probation period to prevail over Clause 4A

Clause 4A of Schedule-I of the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 (Model Standing Orders), which requires a probationer to be made permanent by "an order in writing" within seven days of completing three months of service, provided the manager may terminate services if performance is unsatisfactory

Rule 32 of the same Orders, which stipulates that the Standing Orders shall not operate to the prejudice of any right under a contract of service

Doctrine of "deemed confirmation," as clarified in Supreme Court precedents of Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary School v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena and High Court of M.P. v. Satyanarayan Jhavar, establishing that if a rule requires a specific act (like an order in writing) for confirmation, mere continuation in service beyond the probation period does not result in automatic permanency

The Court reasoned that Clause 4A must be read holistically; it imposes a duty on the manager to issue an "order in writing" to make a probationer permanent, which implies a necessitated assessment of performance

The second proviso of Clause 4A expressly preserved the employer's right to terminate a probationer whose services are found unsatisfactory

The Court held that Row 32 ensures the most beneficial provision (between the contract and Standing Orders) applies to the worker, but it does not dispense with the requirement of a formal act of confirmation

The appointment letters specifically stated that confirmation would only be granted via a "separate letter" if performance was satisfactory; otherwise, employment would end upon the expiry of the probation

Since no such written confirmation was ever issued, the Appellants remained probationers

The Court distinguished Raymond Uco Denim Pvt. Ltd. v. Praful Warade, noting that in that case, the employer had actually confirmed the employees, whereas here, the Respondent consistently treated the relationship as ending upon the expiry of the probation period

The termination of the Appellants upon the expiry of their contractual probation did not constitute an unfair labour practice, as they had no vested right to permanency without a formal confirmation letter; The Court affirmed the Industrial Court’s decision to set aside the Labour Court's order for reinstatement and back wages