Compliance with directions to hold a review DPC precludes contempt even if the outcome is adverse.

The petitioner filed a contempt petition alleging willful disobedience of the Division Bench order dated 15th March 2024 in W.P.(C) 7486/2019.

That order directed the respondents to conduct a review Departmental Promotional Committee (DPC) for the post of Director, reckoning the petitioner's seniority as Deputy Director from 16th July 2007 until his superannuation.

The petitioner had challenged the initial order in the Supreme Court, which disposed of the SLP on 20th December 2024, granting him liberty to pursue remedies if the DPC recommendation was adverse.

Subsequently, the respondent filed an affidavit stating that the review DPC was held, but the petitioner was found "unfit" for promotion.

A Memorandum dated 20th February 2025 was issued communicating this result to the petitioner.

1. Whether the respondents committed "wilful disobedience" of the Court’s directions dated 15th March 2024, warranting contempt proceedings.

2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a protection of the limitation period for filing a fresh challenge against the review DPC’s findings before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

Under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the court examines whether there is a "wilful disobedience" of an order.

The Court applied the principle of judicial remedy as directed by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No. 26895/2024, which established that once a directed administrative action (like a DPC) is performed, any grievance regarding the outcome of that action constitutes a fresh cause of action to be pursued in accordance with law.

The Court analyzed whether the respondents had fulfilled the specific mandate of the order dated 15th March 2024. It observed that the primary direction was to "hold a review DPC".

Upon perusal of the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the Memorandum dated 20th February 2025, the Court found that the review DPC had indeed been convened and had assessed the petitioner. Although the petitioner was found "unfit," the Court reasoned that the act of holding the DPC constituted substantial compliance with the judicial direction.

Following the Supreme Court's observation, the Court determined that the merits of the "unfit" finding could not be adjudicated in a contempt jurisdiction; instead, the petitioner must challenge the new Memorandum through the appropriate legal forum.

To ensure the petitioner was not prejudiced by time spent in these proceedings, the Court exercised its discretion to waive the limitation period for a limited window.

The contempt petition was disposed of. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to challenge the Memorandum dated 20th February 2025 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). It further directed that if the petition is filed before the CAT within four weeks of the judgment (21st July 2026), the issue of limitation shall not impede the relief sought.