Compounding of Pre-Marital Relationship Dispute Cannot Be Sole Ground to Conclude Unsuitability for Police Service

The appellant was provisionally selected as a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constable (SCTPC)

He truthfully disclosed his involvement in Crime No. 190/2014 under Sections 417, 420, and 506/34 of the IPC, involving allegations that he cheated a victim by promising marriage after a four-year relationship

The case was compounded via Lok Adalat on 31.05.2015

Despite this, the respondents cancelled his selection on 29.01.2021, arguing that the offence involved moral turpitude and the compromise amounted to an "admission of guilt"

A Single Judge of the High Court set aside the cancellation, but a Division Bench reversed that decision, holding that the employer is the best judge of suitability for a disciplined force

Section 320(8) of the CrPC, which stipulates that the compounding of an offence shall have the effect of an acquittal

Avtar Singh v. Union of India, which mandates that even after disclosure, the employer must objectively consider the nature of the offence and the effect of the acquittal

Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India regarding the high standards for disciplined forces

Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which emphasizes a holistic consideration of the socio-economic strata, the nature of the query, and the contents of the cancellation order when adjudging suitability

The Court observed that while an employer has the right to assess suitability, such decisions cannot be arbitrary and must be based on material indicating that a crime involving moral turpitude was actually committed

The Court found the respondents' reasoning—that a compromise equates to an "admission of guilt"—to be "completely perverse and defies logic"

It noted that the allegations involved two consenting adults in a long-term relationship, and physical intimacy in such a context does not inherently constitute cheating or low moral fabric

Since the victim chose to compound the offence and there was no evidence of threat or allurement to force the settlement, the indictment alone (which was never tested in trial) provided no basis to override the presumption of innocence

The Court distinguished this from Mehar Singh, where the acquittal involved violent acts against public officials/property, whereas the present case was a private matter between neighbors

It held that the Screening Committee's decision was arbitrary because there was no material evidence linking the appellant to a crime of moral turpitude beyond a withdrawn allegation

The Court restored the Single Judge’s order, directing the respondents to reconsider the appellant for appointment and training