Compulsory Child Counseling Cannot Be Ordered Solely on Parental Apprehensions of Alienation Without Substantive Evidence

The petitioner (husband) challenged an order dated 18.12.2025 passed by the Family Court, Valsad, in Family Suit No. 91 of 2025.

The respondent (wife) had filed for divorce on grounds of cruelty and impotency.

While the Family Court granted the petitioner limited visitation rights via a compromise, the petitioner filed an application (Exh. 18) seeking counseling for his two minor daughters (aged 7–8) by a qualified child counselor.

He alleged "parental alienation," claiming the children were initially happy to meet him but later became hesitant and reluctant, suggesting they were being influenced by the mother.

The Family Court rejected the application, leading to this supervisory writ petition.

1. Whether the Family Court committed a jurisdictional error or grave dereliction of duty under Article 227 in refusing to order child counseling during divorce proceedings.

2. Whether the apprehension of parental alienation is sufficient to compel minor children of tender age to undergo psychological counseling.

The court applied the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as defined in Garment Crafts v. Prakash Chand Goel, which restricts interference to cases of "serious dereliction of duty" or "flagrant violation of fundamental principles" rather than mere errors of fact.

Regarding child welfare, the court relied on the "paramount consideration" principle found in the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

It further cited Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, emphasizing that children are not "chattels" or "play-things" and their welfare must outweigh the absolute rights of parents.

The High Court observed that the underlying litigation is a divorce proceeding, not a custody battle, and the children have resided with the mother since the separation.

The court reasoned that children aged 7–8 are too young to comprehend matrimonial complexities and that forcing them into counseling based on the father's "mere apprehension" of alienation—unbacked by substantive evidence—could cause emotional harm.

It held that the Family Court’s decision was justified as it correctly balanced the children’s tender age against the petitioner's desire for clinical intervention.

The High Court found no perversity or legal flaw in the lower court's refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

It concluded that compelling tender-age children to undergo counseling without sufficient justification is not in their best interest.

The petition was dismissed at the admission stage with a cost of Rs. 10,000, to be deposited by the petitioner and disbursed to the two minor daughters.