Compulsory retirement cannot be imposed after superannuation absent statutory authority.

The petitioner was appointed as a Typist in Dibrugarh University on 15 March 1967 and was subsequently promoted as Section Officer in the Examination Branch.

In 2003, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and four other employees concerning the clearance of bills raised by M/s Padmini Printing Press. A joint departmental enquiry found Charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 proved, while Charge 3 was not proved.

On the basis of the enquiry report, the Executive Council imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement with effect from 31 December 2004.

The petitioner challenged the penalty in WP(C) No. 3051/2005. By order dated 9 February 2015, the High Court set aside the penalty because the enquiry report had not been supplied to him before the disciplinary authority considered it, while granting liberty to the University to take a fresh decision.

After issuing a fresh show-cause notice and considering the petitioner’s reply, the Executive Council again imposed compulsory retirement, retrospectively with effect from 31 December 2004, by order dated 10 November 2016.

During the writ proceedings, the Executive Council modified the effective date to 10 November 2016.

Meanwhile, it came to the Court’s notice that the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation and retired on 30 April 2009.

Whether the University could impose the substantive penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner after he had superannuated on 30 April 2009.

Whether compulsory retirement could validly be imposed retrospectively with effect from 31 December 2004, after the original penalty order had been set aside.

Whether the Executive Council’s subsequent decision to impose compulsory retirement with effect from 10 November 2016 cured the legal defect in the earlier order.

The Court applied Clause 33(vi)(f) of the Dibrugarh University Employees’ Service Condition Ordinance, 2000, under which compulsory retirement is a disciplinary penalty applicable to an Officer/Employee during service; the Ordinance contained no provision authorising imposition of such penalties after superannuation or with retrospective effect.

The Court relied on UCO Bank & Ors. v. Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade, (2018) 14 SCC 98, which holds that, unless the governing regulations expressly provide otherwise, disciplinary proceedings initiated before retirement may continue after retirement, but substantive service penalties cannot be imposed upon a superannuated employee; post-retirement consequences must arise under an applicable pension provision.

The Court also applied the principle that a fresh decision following quashing of an earlier penalty must operate prospectively and cannot retrospectively revive a penalty already set aside.

The petitioner had retired on 30 April 2009, whereas the fresh penalty order was passed on 10 November 2016. The 2000 Ordinance did not preserve jurisdiction to impose compulsory retirement after superannuation.

Although the departmental proceeding could be continued pursuant to the earlier remand, the University’s authority was limited to taking a legally permissible fresh decision; it could not impose a substantive service penalty upon a retired employee.

The retrospective effective date of 31 December 2004 was independently impermissible because the original penalty order dated 31 December 2004 had already been quashed in 2015, and the remand did not authorise its revival with retrospective effect.

The subsequent modification fixing the effective date as 10 November 2016 did not cure the defect, since the petitioner had already superannuated by then.

Applying Karvade, the Court held that the penalty orders were without jurisdiction and unsustainable.

The petitioner was deemed to have continued in service until his superannuation on 30 April 2009.

Since the interference was based on the procedural and jurisdictional invalidity of the penalty, and not an exoneration on merits, he was deemed to have remained under suspension from 31 December 2004 until superannuation.

The University was directed to notionally fix his salary as on 30 April 2009, treat the suspension period as qualifying for pension and other retiral benefits, and pay the admissible subsistence allowance and revised pensionary benefits after adjusting amounts already paid.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of.