Concurrent factual findings in a second appeal are not revisited absent perversity or legal error.

The appellant and the second plaintiff, together with the first defendant, were children of Venkataramani. After his death intestate in 2007, the plaintiffs claimed shares in two properties and sought accounts concerning fixed deposits.

The first defendant asserted that the second plaintiff had been adopted by their aunt and that Venkataramani had executed a registered Will dated 7 November 2001 in his favour. The plaintiffs disputed the adoption and the Will, and claimed that one property was ancestral.

The trial court dismissed the suit; the first appellate court affirmed. The first plaintiff appealed under Section 100 CPC.

Whether the second plaintiff’s failure to testify could establish the alleged adoption when the first defendant bore the burden of proving it.

Whether the Will was duly proved, including its execution and attestation, and whether the circumstances relied on by the plaintiffs—including the exclusion of daughters—undermined its validity.

Whether the property at Door No. 8 was ancestral/coparcenary property in which the plaintiffs had an independent share.

Whether the concurrent findings involved an error of law or other ground for interference under Section 100 CPC.

Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the person asserting adoption must prove it; giving and taking of the child is an essential requirement.

The burden of proving a fact lies on the party asserting it under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

A Will must be proved in accordance with Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and Section 68 of the Evidence Act; the propounder must establish due execution and attestation and address legitimate suspicious circumstances. Registration alone does not prove a Will’s validity.

The Court referred to H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh on proof of Wills and suspicious circumstances, and to Saminatha Iyer v. Vageesan and Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai in relation to adoption.

Under Section 100 CPC, concurrent factual findings are not disturbed merely because another view is possible; interference requires a substantial question of law, such as perversity, illegality or an error of law.

The Court held that the second plaintiff’s absence from the witness box could not, by itself, prove adoption. The first defendant had not provided convincing evidence of the adoption’s date, place or manner, or examined a witness to the giving and taking; nevertheless, the Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose on the adoption issue.

On the Will, the Court noted that the lower courts had accepted the attesting witnesses’ evidence and found due proof; although registration alone was insufficient, it found no demonstrated perversity or illegality warranting appellate interference.

On Door No. 8, the plaintiffs had not sufficiently established that it retained an ancestral or coparcenary character after devolving on Venkataramani, and the concurrent finding that it was his separate property was left undisturbed.

Applying the restricted scope of Section 100 CPC, the Court declined to reappraise the concurrent factual findings.

It made no order as to costs.