Concurrent factual findings remain undisturbed in second appeal absent a substantial question of law.

The appellants, legal heirs of Late Baliram Kumar, claimed ownership over land covered by Dag No. 411 of N.K.P. No. 5 under Katain No. 105.

A portion of the land was acquired by the State for construction of a National Highway, and compensation for the acquired land was paid to them.

The appellants further claimed compensation for a house allegedly standing on the acquired portion.

They admitted before the trial court that, acting on the advice of the concerned Circle Officer, they had demolished the house themselves.

The Munsiff No. 1, Nalbari, dismissed Title Suit No. 61/2009 on the ground that the appellants failed to prove the existence of the house.

The Civil Judge, Nalbari, affirmed that decision in Title Appeal No. 7/2014 by judgment dated 21 July 2014.

The appellants preferred the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether the courts below erred in not declaring the appellants’ title over the suit house on the basis of the documents allegedly proved by them?

Whether the appeal involved a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below?

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law, which must be precisely formulated and decided.

Concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the first appellate court ordinarily cannot be disturbed in second appeal.

The Court relied on Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134, which reaffirmed that a High Court cannot reappreciate or interfere with concurrent factual findings in a second appeal merely because those findings may be alleged to be erroneous.

The first appellate court is generally the final court of fact, and interference under Section 100 CPC is permissible only where a substantial question of law arises.

The appellants’ claim for compensation for the house depended upon proof that a house in fact existed on the acquired land.

Both the trial court and the first appellate court found, on appreciation of the evidence, that the appellants had failed to establish the existence of such a house.

The substantial question framed by the High Court—whether title over the house should have been declared on the basis of the documents—was held to be a question of fact dependent upon the evidence, rather than a substantial question of law.

Since the concurrent factual findings did not disclose any legally substantial issue, the High Court held that it could not reassess the evidence or interfere under Section 100 CPC.

The Regular Second Appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the trial court record was directed to be sent back.