Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The appellant, claiming to be an agricultural tenant in possession of the respondents’ agricultural land, instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 134 of 2010 seeking protection against dispossession otherwise than by due process of law.

The respondents, claiming ownership and possession, filed a counterclaim seeking a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with their possession.

The Trial Court held that the appellant failed to prove either his tenancy or possession and decreed the respondents’ counterclaim.

The Principal District Judge, Patan, dismissed the appellant’s appeals in Regular Civil Suit Nos. 43 and 44 of 2019 and affirmed the Trial Court’s judgment and decree dated 2 May 2019.

The appellant thereafter preferred the present second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which were heard together because they involved a common issue.

Whether the second appeals raised any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the CPC with the concurrent findings that the appellant was neither in possession of the suit land nor proved to be an agricultural tenant.

Whether the concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court were perverse, grossly erroneous, contrary to law, or based on inadmissible or no evidence so as to justify interference in second appeal.

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises.

It held that concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse, grossly erroneous, contrary to mandatory legal provisions, based on inadmissible evidence, or unsupported by evidence.

Relying on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, the Court reiterated that even erroneous findings of fact do not justify interference in second appeal in the absence of a clear error of law or perversity.

Relying on Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, and the principles stated in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Court further held that the High Court cannot substitute its view for that of the First Appellate Court unless the findings are legally unsustainable, based on inadmissible evidence, or arrived at without evidence.

The Court found that both courts below had concurrently determined, on appreciation of the evidence, that the appellant neither possessed the suit property nor established the alleged tenancy, while the respondents’ possession and entitlement to an injunction against interference had been accepted.

The appellant’s challenge essentially sought reappreciation of the evidence, including reliance on the respondent’s alleged admissions concerning his occupation and knowledge of crops.

However, the Court held that the appellant could not demonstrate perversity, absence of evidence, reliance on inadmissible evidence, or any gross error of law in the concurrent findings.

Consequently, the proposed questions in the memoranda of appeal were held to be factual questions, rather than substantial questions of law contemplated by Section 100 CPC.

Both Second Appeal Nos. 449 and 501 of 2026 were dismissed in limine, without an order as to costs.

The connected Civil Applications for stay were consequently disposed of as having become infructuous.