Concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership and tenancy preclude interference under Section 100 CPC absent perversity.

The plaintiffs (Respondents 1-3) filed a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent, and damages regarding a shop in 'Surana Bhawan', Durg

They claimed ownership via a 1966 partition deed and alleged a landlord-tenant relationship with a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-

The original defendant, Dwarka Prasad Soni, denied the tenancy, claiming ownership based on an unregistered Agreement to Sell dated 10.05.1972 (Ex. D/12) for Rs. 9,051/-

His legal heirs (Appellants) later raised a counter-claim for declaration of title via adverse possession

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the counter-claim; the First Appellate Court affirmed this, though it modified the rent/mesne profits to Rs. 21/- per month

The Appellants approached the High Court in Second Appeal.

Whether the defendants established ownership through the Agreement to Sell dated 10.05.1972 or via the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act

Whether the defendants perfected their title through adverse possession

Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts involved any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the CPC

The court primarily applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, which restricts Second Appeals to "substantial questions of law" and shields concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse

It relied on the principle from *State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019)*, holding that concurrent findings cannot be disturbed unless recorded *de hors* pleadings or based on misreading of evidence

Regarding property law, it applied Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act for part performance, Section 90 of the Evidence Act regarding the presumption of ancient documents (30 years old), and Section 116 of the Evidence Act regarding the estoppel of a tenant from denying a landlord's title

The Court observed that both lower courts correctly identified the plaintiffs as lawful owners based on the 1966 registered partition deed

It rejected the Appellants' reliance on the 1972 Agreement to Sell (Ex. D/12) because the handwriting expert (DW-2) admitted they had not compared the signatures against an original standard document

The Court held that an agreement to sell does not, by itself, transfer ownership

On the claim of adverse possession, the Court reasoned that since the defendants entered as tenants (a permissive arrangement), such possession could not ripen into adverse title without a clear, hostile assertion of title known to the true owner

Finding no perversity in the lower courts' appreciation of electricity and property tax records which favored the plaintiffs, the Court determined that the grounds raised were mere questions of fact, not substantial questions of law

It held that the plaintiffs are the rightful owners and the defendants are merely tenants liable for eviction and payment of arrears/mesne profits

The Court directed the Appellants to deliver vacant possession of the suit shop to the plaintiffs within three months

No substantial question of law was found