Concurrent Findings of Fact Supporting Recovery of Dues Cannot Be Re-Appreciated in Second Appeal Absent Perversity

The Plaintiff (Respondent No. 1), a brick manufacturer, sued the Defendant (Appellant) for specific performance of a contract or, alternatively, recovery of ₹48,200/-, representing the cost of bricks supplied for construction.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant executed an agreement on 16.09.2009 (Ex.P-1) promising to pay the debt by 24.03.2010, failing which he would execute a sale deed for his land (Khasra No. 85/2).

The Defendant denied the agreement, claiming it was fabricated and alleging existing enmity and illegal brick manufacturing by the Plaintiff.

The Trial Court partially allowed the suit, granting recovery of money but denying specific performance. The First Appellate Court affirmed this judgment.

The Defendant filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of debt and the execution of the agreement (Ex.P-1) were perverse or contrary to evidence.

2. Whether the rejection of the application for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the First Appellate Court caused serious prejudice to the Appellant.

3. Whether the case involves any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the CPC.

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, which restricts Second Appeals to "substantial questions of law".

Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless shown to be perverse or based on no evidence.

State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) regarding the limited grounds for assailing findings of fact.

Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth (2026), which established that even wrong or inexcusable findings of fact by lower courts do not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law.

The Court observed that both the Trial and First Appellate Courts concurrently found that the Plaintiff had proved the supply of bricks and the execution of the agreement (Ex.P-1) via oral testimony and attesting witnesses.

The Court noted that the Defendant failed to disprove his signatures through expert evidence and failed to respond to the legal notice, leading to an adverse inference.

Regarding the denial of specific performance, the Court agreed with the lower courts that the land transfer clause was intended as security for repayment, not a contract for sale, especially since the Defendant’s title was not proven.

The High Court reasoned that the Appellant's arguments essentially sought a re-appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court found no perversity or misapplication of law in the lower courts' reliance on the evidence.

The Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts, affirming the decree for recovery of ₹48,200/- with 6% interest per annum and the refusal of the decree for specific performance.