Condition of being "boarded out" is a valid intelligible differentia for inter-se priority in CW quota admissions.

Petitioner No. 2, an Army officer, was declared a "Battle Casualty" after sustaining 40% disability during "Operation Rakshak" in 2001.

Under the Army Policy of 1997, he was retained in service rather than being "boarded out" and eventually took premature retirement (PMR) in 2011.

His son, Petitioner No. 1, sought admission to Delhi University under the Children/Widows (CW) quota.

The Ministry of Defence's Policy dated 21.05.2018 ("2018 Policy") restricted "Priority-II" (higher preference) to wards of those "disabled in action and boarded out from service".

Wards of disabled personnel who were retained in service and later retired (like the Petitioner) were categorized under "Priority-VI" (Wards of ESM).

Petitioner No. 1 challenged the 2018 Policy as discriminatory and sought "Priority-II" status.

The Court applied the principle of Reasonable Classification under Article 14 of the Constitution, which permits differentiation based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object.

It relied on *Binoy Viswam v. Union of India* regarding the limits of mechanical equality.

The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation was evaluated through *State of Bihar v. Sachindra Narayan*, establishing that expectations must have a legal or customary basis.

The Court followed the principle that Vested Rights only accrue when a legal right has crystallized under an existing statute or policy, citing *MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh*.

Finally, it applied the rule that there is no Negative Equality against perpetuating administrative errors, as held in *Tinku v. State of Haryana*.

The Court found that the 2018 Policy’s classification is rational because "boarded out" personnel suffer immediate loss of salary and career progression, unlike those retained in service who continue to receive full pay and benefits.

This creates an "intelligible differentia" justified by the objective of compensating those with greater financial/professional hardship.

The Court rejected the "retrospectivity" argument, noting that as of 2011 (retirement date), there was no policy for reservations in non-medical courses; thus, no vested right existed to be taken away.

The Court further clarified that Rule 4 of the Entitlement Rules (pension) is a legal fiction for financial benefits and cannot be imported into educational reservation policies.

Regarding the administrative error where the Petitioner was briefly granted "Priority-IV," the Court held it could not compel the State to perpetuate an illegality.

"Priority-II" is strictly for those disabled in action and boarded out via an Invalided Medical Board (IMB).

Personnel who took premature retirement after being retained in service fall correctly under "Priority-VI".

Previous instances of admission (e.g., *Aditi Singh*) or administrative errors do not create a right to "negative equality".

No relief was granted.