Condonation of delay denied under Section 14 Limitation Act for lack of diligence in pursuing wrong forum.

The Appellants are High Tension Open Access Captive Power Consumers who originally enjoyed "Deemed Demand Charges" (DDC) under a 2006 Tariff Order

Subsequent Tariff Orders in 2012 and 2013 introduced "Billing Demand," effectively discontinuing DDC

In 2013, the Respondent (TNPDCL) issued a clarificatory circular confirming the withdrawal of DDC based on the 2013 Tariff Order

The Appellants challenged this circular via writ petitions in the Madras High Court instead of appealing the Tariff Orders

While the Single Bench quashed the circular in 2018, the Division Bench reversed this in 2025, holding that the 2013 Tariff Order had rationalized new charges and the writ petitions were not maintainable without challenging the underlying Tariff Orders

The Supreme Court dismissed the Appellants' SLPs but granted liberty to challenge the Tariff Orders before the appropriate forum, keeping the question of "maintainability" open

Consequently, these appeals were filed with a delay of over 3,000 to 5,000 days

1. Whether the Appellants are entitled to the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the period spent litigating before the High Court.

2. Whether the "liberty" granted by the Supreme Court to file appeals serves to automatically condone the massive delay in filing.

The Tribunal applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in a former civil proceeding if conducted with "due diligence" and in "good faith" in a court that suffered from a "defect of jurisdiction"

It relied on Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. to define "other cause of like nature"

Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department for the five mandatory conditions to invoke Section 14

The principle that "maintainability" includes statutory bars like limitation, as seen in Deepak Manaklal Katariay v. Ashok Motilal Katariya

Arifa v. Abhiman Apartment Co-op Housing Society regarding the effect of "liberty to file" on limitation

The Tribunal found that the Appellants failed to meet the criteria of "good faith" and "due diligence" required by Section 14

The 2012 and 2013 Tariff Orders clearly indicated the discontinuation of DDC, yet the Appellants deliberately chose to challenge a mere clarificatory circular in the High Court rather than the substantive Tariff Orders in the Tribunal

Any lingering ambiguity was resolved by the 2017 Tariff Order, which explicitly stated DDC had been withdrawn; however, the Appellants continued their writ proceedings for several years thereafter

The Tribunal held that the "liberty" granted by the Supreme Court did not bypass the Limitation Act, especially since the Supreme Court specifically kept "maintainability" (which encompasses limitation) open for the Tribunal's determination

The delay of 3,000-5,000 days was deemed "enormous" and unexplained

Consequently, all appeals (DFR Nos. 114, 121, 122, 123, 124, 139, and 112 of 2026) were dismissed as barred by limitation