Condonation of delay is an exception, not a right, available to government departments without sufficient cause.

The State of Chhattisgarh (Appellants) challenged a Single Judge order dated 28.03.2025, which directed the consideration of Respondent No. 1’s absorption/regularization in service.

Following the order, the State department rejected the Respondent's representation on 18.06.2025.

Although various inter-departmental letters were exchanged between June 2025 and January 2026 to initiate an appeal, the writ appeal was eventually filed on 09.01.2026, resulting in a delay of 255 days.

The Appellants filed I.A. No. 01 of 2026 seeking condonation of this delay, citing a bona fide impression that the matter was to be resolved via departmental representation first.

Whether the Appellants established "sufficient cause" under the law of limitation to warrant the condonation of a 255-day delay in filing the writ appeal.

Whether Government departments are entitled to a more liberal standard or a separate period of limitation compared to private litigants.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the condonation of delay.

It relied on Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited (2012), which held that Government bodies must provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation for delay and cannot claim a separate period of limitation due to procedural "red-tape."

The Court further cited State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024) and Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram (2023), establishing that "sufficient cause" requires adequate reasons preventing a party from approaching the court within the prescribed time, and that subsequent events after the expiry of limitation are irrelevant.

Finally, it referenced Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025), emphasizing that Courts should not legitimize the "callous attitude" or "lethargy" of State authorities.

The Court observed that the Appellants failed to provide a specific or justifiable cause for the 255-day delay.

While the Appellants argued they were waiting for the departmental representation process to conclude, the Court found this lacked the specificity required to constitute "sufficient cause."

Applying the principles from Postmaster General, the Court reasoned that the law of limitation binds the Government and private parties equally, and that modern technology renders the "bureaucratic methodology" of file-shuffling an unacceptable excuse.

The Court noted that the Appellants were negligent and inactive, failing to demonstrate the "due diligence" expected of a State machinery.

Following Ramkumar Choudhary, the Court held that the explanation lacked bona fides and that condonation should remain an exception rather than an anticipated benefit for the State.

The Court refused to exercise its discretionary power to condone the 255-day delay, asserting that rendering "substantial justice" does not mean causing prejudice to the opposite party by ignoring procedural rigors.

Consequently, Writ Appeal No. 179 of 2026 was dismissed solely on the grounds of delay and laches.