Condonation of delay refused where contradictory pleadings fail to establish "sufficient cause" for inordinate delay.

The National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Commercial Court.

On 15.02.2018, the Court dismissed the matter in default due to the NHAI’s failure to deposit deficit court fees and the non-appearance of its counsel.

The appellant filed the present appeal on 20.10.2020 with a delay of 669 days.

The formal application for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 6728/2022) was not filed until 24.06.2022, nearly four years after the original dismissal.

The appellant claimed their counsel failed to intimate them of the case status, though the court found these pleadings contradictory.

The Court primarily applied the doctrine of "sufficient cause" as interpreted under the Limitation Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024), which held that delay caused by the "callous and lackadaisical attitude" of State officials should not be excused as a matter of generosity and requires fixing responsibility on negligent officers.

Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi and Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, establishing that "sufficient cause" cannot be interpreted so liberally as to ignore negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.

The Court observed that the appeal was legally non-existent until the condonation application was filed in 2022, creating a practical delay of over four years from the date of the impugned order.

The court found the appellant's explanation—that the counsel failed to inform them of the dismissal—to be "self-contradictory" and insufficient to explain the 669-day initial delay or the subsequent two-year delay in filing the condonation application.

Applying the Ramkumar Choudhary standard, the Court determined that the NHAI was not diligent in its prosecution, as evidenced by its prior failure to pay court fees in the lower court.

The Court reasoned that condoning such gross negligence would cause prejudice to the opposite party and undermine the statutory rigors of limitation.

The application for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 6728/2022) was rejected as devoid of merit.

The Arbitration Appeal was dismissed both on grounds of limitation and on the observation that the appellant's conduct in the lower court was negligent.