Consensual relationship involving marriage promise requires trial to determine if consent was vitiated by fraud.

The petitioner sought quashment of FIR Crime No. 54/2026 registered at P.S. Maharajpura for offences under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

Both parties are airline employees who developed a mutual affection in 2024.

The prosecutrix alleged that the petitioner established physical relations with her starting April 11, 2025, based on a promise of marriage.

On October 31, 2025, the petitioner allegedly refused to marry her and threatened her life.

The petitioner contended the relationship was consensual between educated adults and that the FIR was a retaliatory measure following a failed relationship and monetary disputes.

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the BNS.

Whether the High Court, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, can adjudicate disputed questions of fact regarding the genuineness of a promise to marry or the consensual nature of a relationship.

The court applied Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which governs the inherent powers of the High Court to quash proceedings to prevent abuse of process.

It applied Sections 69 (sexual intercourse by deceitful means/assurance to marry) and 351(2) (criminal intimidation) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

The court relied on the established principle that quashment is an exception to be used sparingly only when a complaint is "manifestly absurd" or "inherently improbable."

It distinguished between a "breach of promise" and a "false promise from inception," noting that the latter vitiates consent.

The court reasoned that under Section 528 of the BNSS, its role is limited to examining whether the FIR's allegations, if accepted in their entirety, constitute a prima facie case.

The court found that the prosecutrix’s specific allegation—that consent for physical relations was obtained solely through an assurance of marriage which was later retracted—squarely falls within the ambit of Section 69 of the BNS.

The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding the consensual nature of the relationship, the delay in filing the FIR, and alleged extortion, identifying these as matters of "evidentiary scrutiny" and "defence" that must be tested during trial rather than at the quashing stage.

Furthermore, the court clarified that the prior grant of anticipatory bail is not a valid ground for quashing an FIR, as bail considerations differ from the merits of the criminal charges.

The court held that it cannot resolve disputed questions of fact under its inherent jurisdiction when a prima facie offence is made out.

The petition was dismissed.