Consensual relationship turned acrimonious due to breach of promise by complainant does not constitute rape.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the act of Applicant No. 3, as alleged in the complaint, constitutes the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC or is a case of consensual sex

The court held

The court answered the issues in the negative, holding that the allegations did not constitute the necessary ingredients of the alleged offences and that the proceedings were manifestly attended with mala fides.

It also directed

The court held that permitting the trial would be an abuse of process as there was no reasonable prospect of conviction. The application was allowed, and the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 53786 of 2022 along with the summoning order dated 19.11.2022 were quashed.

01Facts

Applicant No. 3 and Opposite Party No. 2 (OP2) met through Shaadi.com and became engaged on 30.10.2021

¶ 2-3

Marriage dates were fixed for November 2022

¶ 3

In February 2022, Applicant No. 3 received obscene photographs of OP2 from a third party, Haris Javed Ansari, revealing prior undisclosed relationships

¶ 4

Despite a religious oath of fidelity by OP2 and an apology from Ansari, the relationship strained

¶ 4-5

OP2 subsequently fixed her marriage with another person for the same date originally set with the Applicant

¶ 5

OP2 then filed a criminal complaint alleging rape under the false promise of marriage

¶ 6

The applicants sought quashing of the complaint and the summoning order dated 19.11.2022

¶ 1

02Issues

i.1. Whether the act of Applicant No. 3, as alleged in the complaint, constitutes the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC or is a case of consensual sex

¶ 14

ii.2. Whether the allegation of rape on the false promise of marriage is prima facie established given the attending circumstances

¶ 14

iii.3. Whether the criminal proceedings were instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, warranting interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

¶ 16-17

03Law Applied

The court applied the distinction between "rape" and "consensual sex" under Section 375 and 376 IPC, noting that "misconception of fact" under Section 90 IPC only vitiates consent if a promise was false from its inception.

¶ 12

It relied on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), which holds that a breach of promise made in good faith is not a "false promise".

¶ 12

The court utilized the four-step veracity test from Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of U.P. (2025) to evaluate material of "sterling quality".

¶ 19

The guidelines in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) regarding the quashing of maliciously instituted proceedings.

¶ 22

It also referenced Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. (2023) regarding the duty of the court to "read between the lines" in vexatious litigations.

¶ 16

Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 90 Section 375 Section 376

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 5

Special Marriage Act, 1954 Section 4

04Reasoning

The court observed that the relationship was initially aimed at marriage, evidenced by the formal engagement and fixing of dates, indicating the Applicant’s bona fide intention.

¶ 14-15

The marriage failed not due to the Applicant's deceit, but because of intervening "unfortunate developments" regarding OP2’s conduct and her prior relationships, which she admitted by way of not rebutting the allegations in her counter-affidavit.

¶ 15, 21

The court found that OP2 committed the breach of promise by marrying another person on the same date.

¶ 22

Consequently, the essential ingredient of Section 376—a false promise made solely to obtain sexual consent without intent to fulfill it—was missing.

¶ 15

The court determined the complaint was a "classic case of a consensual relationship turning acrimonious" and was filed to settle a personal score after the Applicant discovered OP2's conduct.

¶ 15, 17