Constructive liability for rape under Section 34 IPC attaches to persons facilitating assault without committing penetration.

In March 1984, two female victims were waylaid by five individuals in a village grove while collecting leaves.

The prosecution alleged that two primary accused committed rape while the appellants, Subhash Singh and Sher Singh, facilitated the crime by overpowering the victims and standing guard.

A third appellant, Shanti, died pending appeal.

The Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 376 read with Section 34 of the IPC, sentencing them to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of material contradictions in witness testimony, medical evidence showing an intact hymen in one victim, and the lack of overt sexual acts by the appellants.

The court applied Section 376 (rape) and Section 34 (common intention) of the IPC, noting that Section 34 is a rule of evidence creating joint liability for acts done in furtherance of a shared design.

It relied on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat to establish that a victim's testimony is vital and does not inherently require corroboration.

Precedents like Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana and the erstwhile Section 376(2)(g) IPC (1983 Amendment) were cited to affirm that in gang rape, every member of the group sharing common intention is deemed to have committed the offence regardless of actual penetration.

the court referenced State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar regarding the legal sufficiency of slight penetration without hymenal rupture.

The Court reasoned that the consistent "core" of the victims' testimony outweighed minor discrepancies typical of rustic witnesses.

It rejected the medical argument, clarifying that penetration—however slight—constitutes rape, and an intact hymen does not disprove the assault.

Regarding the appellants' roles, the Court held that active participation, such as pressing a victim's mouth or standing guard to signal danger, constitutes "facilitation" that satisfies the requirement of common intention under Section 34.

The Court observed that "they also serve who only stand and wait," making the appellants equally liable as the principal offenders.

The Court noted the Trial Court erred by not awarding the then-mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and failing to impose a fine, yet declined to increase the sentence since neither the State nor the victim appealed for enhancement.

The Court maintained the status quo to avoid placing the appellants in a worse position in their own appeal and the appellants were ordered to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of their sentence.