Contempt Court cannot issue substantive directions on promotion merits beyond the original judgment's scope.

The appellant, a visually handicapped lecturer, was initially appointed on a part-time basis in 1997. Following a writ petition, the Single Judge directed that her appointment be regularized with seniority and consequential benefits relating back to 1998.

On appeal (LPA 206/2018), a Division Bench modified this, deeming her appointment permanent from 01.01.1998, with actual arrears payable from 16.04.2001.

The appellant later filed a contempt petition (Contempt Case (C) No. 308/2021) alleging non-compliance regarding her promotion to 'Reader' under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) effective from 01.01.2007.

On 18.12.2024, the Contempt Judge directed the University to constitute a Selection Committee for this promotion.

On 14.02.2025, the Single Judge recalled that order and dismissed the contempt petition as satisfied, noting the appellant had since been appointed as an Associate Professor via direct recruitment in 2010.

1. Whether the non-consideration of the appellant for promotion to the post of Reader w.e.f. 01.01.2007 constitutes a contemptuous violation of the previous court orders.

2. Whether a Contempt Court has the jurisdiction to issue fresh directions, such as mandating a Selection Committee, while exercising contempt jurisdiction.

The court primarily relied on the principle that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used to adjudicate new claims or enlarge the scope of the original judgment.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Midnapore People’s Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) held that a Contempt Court is prohibited from passing orders or directions that touch upon the merits of the respective claims of the parties or go beyond the operative directions of the underlying judgment.

The Court observed that the University had already complied with the primary directions regarding seniority fixation (w.e.f. 1998) and payment of arrears.

Regarding the promotion to 'Reader', the Court noted that a previous clarification application (C.M. No. 5576/2020) by the appellant in the original LPA had reached no such direction for promotion.

By accepting a direct recruitment appointment as Associate Professor (equivalent to Reader) on 12.02.2010 and subsequent promotions to Professor and Senior Professor, the appellant's claim for a retrospective CAS promotion to Reader lost its relevance.

The Court reasoned that the Contempt Judge's order dated 18.12.2024, which directed the constitution of a Selection Committee, exceeded the scope of the original mandamus and improperly entered the merits of a new claim, thereby violating the limits of contempt jurisdiction.

The Court affirmed that once the appellant opted for direct recruitment to a higher post, the demand for retrospective promotion via contempt proceedings was unsustainable.

It concluded that the Single Judge correctly recalled the unauthorized directions issued in the contempt proceedings, as a Contempt Court cannot issue substantive fresh directions not contained in the original decree.