Continued misuse after a conversion application attracts charges under subsequent circulars, notwithstanding Clause 7(ii).

The appellant’s father held a residential leasehold property in Meera Bagh. Parts of the property were used as shops, and the DDA issued a notice to stop the misuse in 1988 and determined the sub-lease in 1989.

The appellant applied for conversion to freehold under the 1996 DDA Circular, but the commercial use continued after the application.

The DDA later demanded misuse charges; during the writ proceedings, it recalculated the charges under its 2014 Circular and refunded ₹23,48,175 to the appellant.

The Single Judge directed payment of interest on the refunded sum but otherwise disposed of the writ petition. The appellant’s review petition was dismissed with costs of ₹50,000, after which he brought this appeal.

1. Whether the appellant’s misuse-charge liability was governed exclusively by the 1996 Circular, including Clause 7(ii), because he applied for conversion under that Circular

2. Whether the later DDA Circulars could govern the period for which misuse charges were recoverable where misuse continued after the conversion application

3. Whether the ₹50,000 costs imposed on dismissal of the review petition should stand, given that the appellant had filed it after receiving liberty from the Division Bench

Under Clause 7(ii) of the 1996 Circular, conversion could be permitted for misuse within the prescribed area limits on payment of an additional conversion fee; the clause did not prescribe the period for which misuse charges could be levied.

Clause 6 separately provided for restoration charges and addressed damages following re-entry, while the circulars treated misuse charges as a distinct liability.

The 2001 and 2003 Circulars addressed the period for recovering misuse charges, including where misuse continued after a conversion application; the 2014 Circular subsequently limited charges to a maximum of five years from the date of detection or the date of application, whichever was earlier.

No statute or judicial precedent was identified as material to the Court’s reasoning.

The Court held that Clause 7(ii) concerned the conditions for conversion where misuse fell within the specified area limits, not the duration of misuse-charge liability. The later circulars therefore operated in a separate sphere and could apply where misuse continued after a conversion application.

The appellant did not contend that misuse ceased when he applied for conversion; the record showed it continued, and the Single Judge’s observation that he continued receiving rent from the shops during eviction proceedings was not controverted.

Filing the application did not extinguish liability for continuing misuse, and the charges were not imposed merely because DDA delayed processing the application.

The Court also rejected the argument that the charges were damages barred by Clause 6, since the circulars distinguished damages from misuse charges.

Because the appellant did not press his challenge to the computation under the 2014 Circular, the Court did not examine the ₹9,66,148 assessment.

It dismissed the appeal but waived the ₹50,000 costs imposed in the review proceedings because the appellant had pursued review pursuant to liberty granted by the Court.

Pending applications were disposed of, with no further order as to costs.