Continuing guarantee theory cannot extend limitation for insolvency proceedings beyond three years from the default date.

The Corporate Debtor, M/s. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited, entered into a Facility Agreement with Respondent No. 1 (Financial Creditor) on May 13, 2011, for a loan of INR 25 Crores

The Appellant stood as a Personal Guarantor

Upon default, the Financial Creditor invoked a call option on May 24, 2012, setting a repayment deadline of June 8, 2012

An Arbitral Award was subsequently passed against the Corporate Debtor and the Appellant on March 15, 2013, which attained finality following the dismissal of Section 34 objections by the Bombay High Court on May 5, 2015

Execution proceedings for the award are currently pending

On January 20, 2020, the Financial Creditor issued a demand notice in Form B under Section 95(4)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), citing August 1, 2012, as the date of default

The NCLT, Hyderabad, admitted the Appellant into the Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) via the Impugned Order dated June 24, 2022

1. Whether the initiation of proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC was barred by limitation under Section 238A of the Code

2. Whether the principle of "Continuing Guarantee" under Section 129 of the Indian Contract Act applies to extend the limitation period for insolvency proceedings

The Court applied Section 3(12) of the IBC, which defines "default" as a singular event of non-payment

It relied on Section 238A of the IBC, which extends the Limitation Act, 1963, to the Code

Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues

The Court followed B.K. Educational Services Pvt Ltd v. Parag Gupta, confirming the retrospective application of Section 238A

Ramesh Kymal v. M/s. Siemens Gamesa, which held that the date of default specified in the demand notice is binding and cannot be shifted

Additionally, the "Continuing Guarantee" under Section 129 of the Indian Contract Act was interpreted in light of the IBC's overriding effect under Section 238

The Tribunal rejected the Respondent’s contention that the guarantee was "continuing" under Section 129 of the Contract Act. It reasoned that the IBC is a self-contained statute, and its definition of "default" under Section 3(12) refers to a specific point in time ("when"), not a recurring transaction

The Facility Agreement and its Schedule II did not provide for recurring installments that would characterize the default as continuous

The Tribunal noted that the Financial Creditor’s own demand notice explicitly admitted the date of default as August 1, 2012

Applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the three-year window to file a Section 95 application expired in 2015

Even considering the Arbitral Award (2013) as a fresh cause of action under the Dena Bank principle, the 2020 notice was significantly delayed

The Tribunal emphasized that execution proceedings in Civil Courts do not exclude or extend the limitation period for filing applications under the IBC

The Tribunal concluded that a "continuing guarantee" cannot be used to revive a time-barred debt in the absence of specific contractual terms

The appeal was allowed, and the Impugned Order dated June 24, 2022, was quashed, terminating the insolvency resolution process against the Appellant