Contractual service duration followed by regularisation must be counted as qualifying service for pensionary benefits.

The Respondents (Ayurved Chikitsaks) were initially engaged on a contractual basis between 2002 and 2004 pursuant to advertisements dated 19.12.2001 and 06.10.2003

Despite their "contractual" label, they were selected through a merit-based process and continued in uninterrupted service for over a decade

In 2008, the State framed the Rajasthan Rural Ayurvedic, Unani, Homeopathy and Naturopathy Service Rules, 2008, to regularize such services. Following protracted litigation regarding selection criteria, the Respondents were substantively appointed vide orders dated 25.08.2015

The State subsequently treated them as fresh "Probationer Trainees," denying them the benefit of their prior service (2002–2015) for pension, seniority, and privilege leave. A Single Bench partly allowed the Respondents' writ petition, directing the State to count the prior service for pension and leave, and invalidating the fresh probation requirement

Rule 3(r) and Rule 12(b) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996, which define "qualifying service" to include service rendered in an officiating or temporary capacity from the date of first appointment

Reconciliation of Pension Rules with Rule 2(e) interpreting the "Save as otherwise provided" clause to allow counting of past service upon regularization

Rule 95 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, regarding the accrual of privilege leave for temporary employees subsequently appointed substantively

Principles from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaggo v. Union of India (2024) and Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. (2025), which prohibit "ad-hocism" and require the State, as a "constitutional employer," to recognize the realities of long-term continuous service regardless of the "temporary" or "contractual" label.

The Court rejected the State's argument that the "contractual" nature of the initial engagement barred all benefits. It reasoned that the Respondents were engaged against sanctioned posts via a selection process similar to "urgent temporary appointments" under the 1973 Rules

Since the Respondents worked uninterruptedly from 2002/04 until 2015, were paid from the Consolidated Fund, and performed duties identical to regular employees, their service falls under the "temporary capacity" mentioned in Rule 12(b) of the Pension Rules

Regarding probation, the Court noted that the purpose of probation—evaluating suitability—had already been satisfied over a decade of satisfactory performance; hence, imposing a fresh probation period in 2015 was an "artificial" distinction that elevated form over substance

Under Rule 95 of the RSR, 1951, the Court determined that as "temporary employees" who were substantively appointed without interruption, the Respondents were legally entitled to have their prior service credited for privilege leave

The Division Bench dismissed the State's appeal and upheld the Single Bench's judgment. All pending applications were dismissed.