Conviction altered to Section 304 Part II IPC where knowledge, but not intention, is established.

On March 28, 2015, Haradhan Acharjee (the victim) was allegedly confined and severely assaulted by "Doya Hmar" and two associates at Ditokcherra Bazar

The victim was found in a ditch the next morning and subsequently underwent treatment at SMCH, Silchar, and GMCH, Guwahati, for a cervical spine injury (fracture of the C6 vertebra)

He died approximately two and a half months later on June 16, 2015, after being brought home

The Investigating Officer (I/O) filed a charge-sheet against the appellant (Daineisang Pudaite) and three absconders under Sections 341/302/34 of the IPC

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 341 and 302 of the IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of mistaken identity, lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP), and the significant time gap between the assault and death

1. Whether the identity of the appellant as the assailant "Doya Hmar" was established beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of a Test Identification Parade.

2. Whether the oral dying declarations made by the victim to various witnesses were reliable enough to form the basis of conviction.

3. Whether the cause of death (occurring 2.5 months after the incident) could be directly attributed to the injuries inflicted by the appellant.

4. Whether the act of the appellant amounted to murder under Section 302 or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC.

The Court applied Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of dying declarations, emphasizing that such statements need not be made under expectation of death if they relate to the cause of death

It followed the "Five Golden Principles" of circumstantial evidence established in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

For oral dying declarations, it relied on Kamal Khudal v. State of Assam, requiring a test of reliability

Regarding the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, the Court applied the criteria from Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. to determine "intention" versus "knowledge"

Finally, it referred to Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., holding that a time lag between injury and death does not automatically invalidate a dying declaration

The Court first addressed the identity of the accused; while the appellant claimed his name was not "Doya," the victim’s brother (PW-3) identified him as "Doya Hmar alias Daineisang Pudaite," and the appellant’s own statement under Section 313 CrPC admitted that people in the Ditokcherra market (the crime scene) called him "Daya"

On medical causation, the Court noted the autopsy report (PW-7) confirmed the C6 vertebra fracture was a "fatal" injury caused by blunt force impact, directly linking the assault to the eventual death despite the 2.5-month interval

Regarding the dying declaration, the Court found the oral accounts given by the victim to his brothers (PW-3, PW-5) and coworkers (PW-1, PW-2) were consistent and trustworthy

However, the Court scrutinized the nature of the offense, noting that the prosecution failed to establish premeditation or the use of a specific lethal weapon, and evidence suggested the assailants were under the influence of liquor

Consequently, the Court found that while the appellant had "knowledge" that such an injury to the cervical spine was likely to cause death, the specific "intention" to murder required for Section 302 IPC was not conclusively proven

It held that the offense fell under Section 304 Part II (Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder) rather than Section 302 (Murder)

The conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and substituted with a conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC

The appellant was sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment

The appeal was dismissed subject to this modification of conviction and sentence