Conviction cannot be based on police statements if witnesses resile during trial.

The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for the alleged murder of his wife, Kinjaliben.

The prosecution case, based on an FIR filed by the mother of the deceased (PW-11), alleged that on September 25, 2013, the appellant attacked the deceased with an axe in a cotton field due to suspicion regarding his health.

During the trial, all material witnesses, including the complainant (mother-in-law), the son, and the daughter of the appellant, turned hostile and refused to support the prosecution’s version of the assault.

On January 25, 2017, the Additional Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, convicted the appellant in Sessions Case No. 13 of 2014, primarily relying on the presence of the accused at the scene and the testimony of the Investigating Officer (IO) regarding the prior statements of the witnesses.

Whether the conviction of an accused can be legally sustained based on the contents of police statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when the witnesses resile from those statements during trial?

Whether the "burden of proof" under Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be shifted to the accused to explain a death occurring in an open field when the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case of his involvement?

The court primarily applied Section 302 of the IPC regarding murder.

It relied on the evidentiary restrictions under Sections 161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C., which mandate that police statements are not substantive evidence and can only be used to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

It applied the principle from *Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar*, holding that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

It further cited *Renuka Prasad v. State*, establishing that an IO cannot give legal sanctity to inadmissible Section 161 statements by merely repeating them in court.

The High Court found that the Trial Court committed a grave legal error by treating the IO’s testimony (PW-18) as substantive evidence to prove the "prosecution story" despite witnesses turning hostile.

The Court reasoned that since the incident occurred in an open field where other family members were present, the mere presence of the accused—without proof of an overt act—was insufficient for conviction.

The Court rejected the Trial Court's use of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, noting that the adverse inference regarding "special knowledge" only arises after the prosecution successfully proves facts from which a reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn; here, the prosecution failed to establish the author of the crime.

Consequently, the gap between "may be true" and "must be true" remained unbridged.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt as the conviction was based on inadmissible evidence and misplaced reliance on Section 106.

The appellant was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released from jail forthwith.