Conviction for gang rape cannot rest solely on materially inconsistent testimony of the victim.

The prosecution alleged that on 29 October 2016, the victim, while returning from Kayamnagar, was taken on a motorcycle by two boys to a boring room near Ram Shahar Bagicha, where one boy allegedly committed rape and another attempted to do so. The appellant, Chandan Kumar, was alleged to have been present at the spot and was apprehended by villagers, while the other two accused, Govind Singh and Golu Singh, escaped.

The appellant was charged under Sections 376D, 379 and 34 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The trial court ultimately convicted him under Section 376D IPC and sentenced him to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹50,000.

During trial, the medical officer and investigating officer were examined under Section 299 CrPC while the appellant was declared absconding, though he was subsequently permitted to cross-examine them.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant participated in, or shared a common intention to commit, gang rape punishable under Section 376D IPC.

Whether the victim’s testimony, considered with the medical and investigative evidence, was sufficiently consistent and reliable to sustain the appellant’s conviction without material corroboration.

Whether the delay in registration and transmission of the FIR, inconsistencies regarding the occurrence, and deficiencies in investigation created a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.

Whether the prosecution established that the victim was below 18 years of age so as to attract the POCSO Act.

The Court applied Section 376D IPC, which requires proof of gang rape and the participation or common intention of the accused; Sections 34 and 379 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act were also part of the charges, although the POCSO charge failed for want of proof of minority.

Under the principles governing conviction on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, such testimony may be sufficient if it is wholly reliable and possesses the quality of a “sterling witness”; the Court relied on Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, which requires consistency from the initial version through trial and material correlation with supporting evidence.

The Court further applied the principle that delayed transmission of an FIR may raise suspicion of embellishment or ante-timing, while recognising that delay is not automatically fatal if satisfactorily explained, relying on Meharaj Singh (L/Nk.) v. State of U.P., (1994) 5 SCC 188, and Chotkau v. State of U.P., (2023) 6 SCC 742.

It also applied the presumption of innocence and the rule that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; statutory presumptions do not eliminate the prosecution’s initial burden, as reflected in Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, Latu Das v. State of Assam, 2019 SCC OnLine Gau 5947, and Ramanand v. State of U.P., AIR 2022 SC 5273.

The Court found that the victim’s evidence was materially inconsistent. Her written information stated that two unknown boys took her on a motorcycle after promising to drop her home, whereas her Section 164 CrPC statement stated that five persons had taken her away and did not name any accused.

Her trial testimony also conflicted with the written information concerning whether she had gone for photography, where she had been before the alleged occurrence, and the role and identity of the accused.

The Court considered her conduct of voluntarily accompanying allegedly unknown persons to a lonely location to be unnatural in the circumstances.

The medical evidence disclosed no external or internal injury, an old hymenal rupture, and no definite opinion that rape had occurred.

The investigating officer found no physical indications of the occurrence, did not seize the alleged motorcycle, identified no eyewitnesses, and confirmed that the independent witnesses named in the investigation were not examined.

The delayed transmission of the FIR to the jurisdictional court, without adequate explanation, further weakened its reliability.

Since the victim was not a wholly reliable or “sterling” witness and the remaining evidence did not independently connect the appellant with the offence, the Court held that conviction under Section 376D IPC was unsafe.

As the appellant was in custody, the Court directed that he be released forthwith unless required in any other case. The trial court records were directed to be returned to the trial court.