Conviction under Section 324 IPC cannot stand without proof that hurt was caused by a sharp weapon.

On 17 November 1994 at approximately 7:00 p.m., the informant, Yogendra Prasad Kushwaha, alleged that the appellant abused him, caught his collar, and assaulted him twice with a knife following a dispute concerning the appellant’s goat damaging the informant’s cabbage crop.

The informant’s fardbeyan was recorded at about 8:30 p.m., and Jamobazar P.S. Case No. 69 of 1994 was registered under Sections 341, 323, 504, 324 and 307 IPC.

The prosecution examined six witnesses, including the injured informant, his father, brother, cousin and a local hotel-keeper. The injury reports of the informant and P.W.1 were exhibited through an advocate’s clerk, but neither doctor was examined. The Investigating Officer was also not examined.

The trial court acquitted the appellant under Section 307 IPC but convicted him under Section 324 IPC and sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant voluntarily caused hurt to the informant by means of a knife so as to constitute an offence under Section 324 IPC?

Whether the injury reports could be relied upon when the doctors who prepared them were not examined and the reports were merely tendered through an advocate’s clerk?

Whether the non-seizure of the alleged knife and other material objects, and the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, caused prejudice to the appellant and weakened the prosecution case?

Whether the related and allegedly injured witnesses, in the absence of independent market witnesses and in light of the counter-version, provided reliable evidence sufficient to sustain conviction?

Section 324 IPC requires proof of voluntarily causing hurt by an instrument used for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or by an instrument which, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death; the nature of the injury and the character of the weapon are therefore material ingredients.

The Court relied on Chandradeep @ Chandeep Sao v. State of Bihar, 2014 (2) PLJR 286, for the principle that medical evidence and proof of the weapon are significant in establishing the “means” element of Section 324 IPC.

It also applied the principle that medical evidence is ordinarily corroborative, but a fundamental inconsistency or absence of legally proved medical evidence may undermine the prosecution case, as discussed in State of Uttarakhand v. Darshan Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 605, and Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 2 SCC 174.

Non-examination of the Investigating Officer is not invariably fatal, but it becomes material where demonstrable prejudice is caused, following Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1996) 2 SCC 317, and Lahu Kamlakar Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 417.

The Court further relied on Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC 145, regarding the adverse impact of withholding material independent witnesses, and Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 18 SCC 661, concerning the significance of failure to seize and produce the weapon where ocular evidence is otherwise doubtful.

The Court held that the injury reports were not legally proved because the doctors were not examined and P.W.6, the advocate’s clerk, had no personal knowledge of their preparation or contents.

Consequently, the prosecution lacked admissible medical evidence establishing the nature of the injuries or linking them to a sharp-cutting weapon, both of which were important for sustaining a conviction under Section 324 IPC.

The alleged knife, blood-stained clothes and belt were also neither seized nor produced, further weakening the prosecution’s account.

The non-examination of the Investigating Officer caused demonstrable prejudice because material discrepancies concerning the place of occurrence, the alleged earlier statement of P.W.1, and the appellant’s wife’s counter-complaint could not be tested or explained.

The ocular evidence was additionally treated with caution because the principal witnesses were related to the informant, no independent witness from the busy market was examined, and P.W.1’s alleged injuries were medically examined only three days later, with one injury attributed to a blunt object.

Taken cumulatively, these infirmities created reasonable doubt which could not be overcome merely by relying on the prompt fardbeyan or the assertions of interested witnesses.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20 February 2004 were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

As he was on bail, he was discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of, and the Court directed payment of ₹15,000 to the learned amicus curiae as consolidated fee.