Conviction upheld, but Delhi High Court quashes life sentence and orders release after finding accused was a juvenile at the time of the 1995 murder

The appellant was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, under Sections 394 and 302 IPC for the robbery and murder of Lado Devi on 1 December 1995.

He was sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 394 IPC and life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC, with the sentences to run concurrently.

During the appeal, the appellant claimed that he was below eighteen years of age on the date of the offence and relied on an NIOS Secondary School Examination Mark-Sheet recording his date of birth as 4 October 1978.

The document was subsequently verified by NIOS and found genuine.

An earlier ossification examination conducted pursuant to the High Court’s order also assessed his age as between 22 and 25 years in January 2005, indicating that he was below eighteen on the date of the offence.

The appellant stated that he did not wish to challenge the conviction on merits, but the Court nevertheless examined the prosecution case before determining the appropriate relief.

Whether the appellant, being below eighteen years of age on the date of the offence committed in 1995, was entitled to the benefit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, notwithstanding his subsequent conviction and sentence?

Whether the appellant’s age was established through the NIOS Secondary School Examination Certificate and/or the medical/ossification report in accordance with the applicable age-determination principles?

Whether the finding of juvenility required the conviction itself to be set aside, or only the sentence to be rendered ineffective?

Whether the conviction was sustainable on the circumstantial evidence independently of the appellant’s plea of juvenility?

The Court applied Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 15, 20 and 49 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007.

Under these provisions, juvenility is determined with reference to the accused’s age on the date of the offence; a claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage, including after conviction; and the 2000 Act applies to pending trials, appeals and other proceedings relating to persons who were below eighteen when the offence was committed.

Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, preserves pending proceedings under the earlier regime.

Rule 12(3) prescribes a hierarchy for age determination, giving priority to a matriculation or equivalent certificate, followed by school and birth certificates, and only thereafter medical opinion.

These authorities establish that juvenility claims must be assessed liberally on a preponderance of probability, that conviction is not automatically annulled upon a finding of juvenility, and that the sentence may be rendered ineffective where the statutory juvenile period has expired.

The Court held that the verified NIOS certificate, which recorded the appellant’s date of birth as 4 October 1978, established that he was 17 years, 1 month and 27 days old on 1 December 1995.

Since the certificate was an equivalent secondary-school examination certificate falling within the first category under Rule 12(3)(a), it was entitled to primacy.

The Court rejected the State’s objection that the certificate had been obtained after conviction, observing that, under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 then applicable, the relevant threshold for a male juvenile was sixteen years; therefore, recording an age just above sixteen on the date of the offence would not have conferred any apparent benefit on the appellant.

The ossification report independently supported the conclusion that the appellant was below eighteen on the date of the offence, and the Court held that the State’s request for a fresh inquiry before the Juvenile Justice Board was unnecessary after the prolonged absence of any challenge to that report.

The Court then examined the conviction on merits and found the circumstantial chain complete: the appellant was employed in the deceased’s house, remained there with the deceased when the family left, disappeared after the incident, the deceased was found murdered, property was missing, blood-stained clothes and his footwear were recovered, and he was later found working under an assumed name.

These circumstances were held sufficient to sustain the conviction, but under Karan alias Fatiya, the finding of juvenility affected the enforceability of the sentence rather than the validity of the conviction.

The conviction under Sections 302 and 394 IPC was sustained after independent scrutiny of the circumstantial evidence.

However, considering the appellant’s juvenility, the period already undergone, his present age, and the maximum three-year period of detention contemplated under Section 15(1) of the 2000 Act, the Court quashed the sentences and directed that he be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.

The appeal consequently partially succeeded; the bail bonds and sureties were discharged, and copies of the judgment were directed to be sent to the Trial Court and the Jail Superintendent.