Conviction was unsustainable where severe intellectual disability undermined the prosecutrix’s capacity to give valid evidence.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly entering the complainant’s labour-quarter residence during the intervening night of 20/21 September 2018 and committing rape upon the complainant’s daughter, ‘N’, allegedly aged 12 years.

FIR No. 274 of 2018 was registered on 29 September 2018 under Sections 457, 376 and 511 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

The trial court charged the appellant under Sections 457 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, but found that the prosecution had failed to prove the victim’s age below 18 years; consequently, the POCSO provisions were held inapplicable.

Nevertheless, the trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 457 and 376 IPC and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment for Section 457 and ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for Section 376, along with fines.

The prosecution primarily relied upon the testimony of the prosecutrix, PW-6, her mother/complainant, PW-7, the medical evidence, and the forensic report.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds of contradictions, delay in lodging the FIR, absence of medical or forensic corroboration, the prosecutrix’s severe intellectual disability, and alleged false implication arising from a money dispute.

Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix, who was assessed as suffering from severe intellectual disability and being incapable of giving a valid statement, could safely form the basis of conviction under Sections 457 and 376 IPC.

Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix and her mother was sufficiently consistent and reliable to prove the alleged house-trespass and rape beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the absence of genital injuries, semen, or other forensic evidence materially undermined the prosecution case.

Whether the prosecution proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the delay in lodging the FIR and the alleged monetary dispute between the parties.

Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Sections 457 and 376 IPC were sustainable.

The Court applied Sections 457 and 376 IPC concerning lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night and rape, respectively, and noted that penetration, even partial or slight and with or without emission of semen or rupture of the hymen, is sufficient to constitute rape.

Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, a person is competent to testify if capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers; however, the evidence of a prosecutrix suffering from a serious mental disability must be evaluated with due caution.

The Court relied on Mohd. Imran Khan v. State, State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, State of U.P. v. Pappu, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and other authorities for the principles that a reliable prosecutrix’s testimony can independently sustain conviction, corroboration is not an absolute rule, absence of injuries or semen is not invariably decisive, and minor discrepancies should ordinarily be disregarded; nevertheless, the prosecution must prove every ingredient beyond reasonable doubt and cannot rely on the weakness of the defence.

The Court also considered the principles governing appreciation of medical and forensic evidence and the statutory requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court held that the prosecutrix’s evidence could not be safely relied upon without corroboration because the medical and psychiatric material recorded that she had severe mental retardation, 90% intellectual disability, and was incapable of giving a valid statement.

Although her statement under Section 164 CrPC had been recorded without oath with her mother acting as interpreter, she was subsequently examined on oath before the trial court without any recorded finding that her mental condition had improved or that she understood the questions and could provide rational answers.

The Court further found material inconsistencies between the complaint and the oral evidence.

The complaint stated that the children were sleeping in a separate room, whereas the prosecutrix stated that she was sleeping alone and her mother stated that she was sleeping with a sibling.

The mother’s assertion in court that she had seen the appellant committing intercourse was also an improvement over the complaint, which only stated that she found the appellant lying on the children’s charpai after hearing cries.

The accounts also conflicted regarding whether the appellant fled immediately or was confined in a room before escaping.

These were treated as material contradictions rather than minor discrepancies.

The medical examination disclosed no physical or genital injuries, and the forensic report detected neither blood nor semen on the clothing, vaginal or cervical slides, or pubic hair.

Although such absence would not invariably disprove rape, in the present case it failed to provide the assurance required in view of the unreliable and internally inconsistent oral evidence.

The Court therefore concluded that the prosecution had not established the occurrence or the appellant’s participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant was acquitted of the offences under Sections 457 and 376 IPC because the prosecution evidence, considered cumulatively, did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Any deposited fine was directed to be refunded after expiry of the limitation period, subject to any appellate proceedings.

The appellant was directed to furnish bail bonds of ₹25,000 with one surety under Section 437-A CrPC, corresponding to Section 481 BNSS, for six months.