Counsel’s negligence alone is not sufficient cause to set aside an ex parte decree.

The appellants challenged the Trial Court’s order rejecting their application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree.

They had been proceeded ex parte on 7 January 2020, and the decree was passed on 13 October 2020.

They attributed their non-appearance to their advocate’s lack of diligence and also relied on the COVID-19 lockdown.

The record showed that one appellant had signed an application to recall an earlier adverse order on 30 May 2019.

Whether the appellants established sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for their non-appearance when the matter was called.

Whether the advocate’s alleged lack of diligence or the COVID-19 lockdown justified setting aside the ex parte decree in these circumstances.

Order IX Rule 13 CPC permits a court to set aside an ex parte decree where the defendant was not duly served or establishes sufficient cause for non-appearance when the matter was called.

The Supreme Court decisions in Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti and G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada reaffirm these requirements; the Delhi High Court Division Bench in Sudarshan Sareen v. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. treated them as mandatory.

Under Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., an advocate’s alleged failure to diligently pursue proceedings does not, without sufficient cause, entitle a party to relief under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

The appellants had been duly served and had engaged an advocate, so their application depended on establishing sufficient cause for non-appearance.

Their reliance on counsel’s lack of diligence did not meet that requirement under Salil Dutta.

The appellant’s signature on the 2019 recall application also undermined the claim of complete unawareness and supported the conclusion that the appellants could not shift all responsibility for monitoring the case to counsel.

The COVID-19 lockdown began after the appellants had already been proceeded ex parte in January 2020, and therefore could not explain that earlier default.

It found no basis to interfere with the Trial Court’s rejection of the application and dismissed the appeal; pending applications were also disposed of.