Court Directs Authority to Reconsider Suspension of Home Guard Reinstated Prior to New Restrictive Circular

The petitioner, a Home Guard, was initially suspended on 13.06.2019 following an FIR under the Gujarat Gambling Act.

On 14.09.2019, a competent court passed a penalty order against him, and subsequently, Respondent No. 3 reinstated him on 25.10.2019.

However, following a circular dated 14.11.2019 issued by the Director General of Civil Defence, which noted the absence of reinstatement provisions for Home Guards facing police complaints under the Gujarat Home Guards Act, 1947, the petitioner was suspended again on 07.12.2019.

The petitioner filed a representation for review on 01.01.2020, which remained undecided despite a recommendation from Respondent No. 3 to higher authorities.

1. Whether the second suspension order dated 07.12.2019 was legally sustainable given the petitioner’s prior reinstatement after the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

2. Whether the Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy (appeal) and the delay in filing the petition.

The court examined Section 6B of the Gujarat Home Guards Act, 1947, and the rules formulated thereunder, which govern the suspension and disciplinary procedures for Home Guards.

Specifically, Section 6B(3) provides for a statutory appeal against suspension orders.

The court also considered the administrative circular dated 14.11.2019 issued by the Office of the Director General, Civil Defence, which directed District Commandants to review pending criminal cases before passing reinstatement orders.

The court noted that the petitioner was reinstated after the criminal court’s penalty order, yet was re-suspended solely based on a subsequent administrative circular.

While the respondents argued that the petition was barred by the availability of an alternative remedy and a delay of 11 months, the court observed that Respondent No. 3 had himself requested a review of the suspension from the higher office on 06.01.2020, which remained pending.

Given these "peculiar facts"—specifically that the criminal trial had concluded and the internal review was initiated but not completed—the court found it unnecessary to adjudicate on the merits and instead focused on the failure of the authorities to decide on the petitioner's pending representation.

It did not quash the suspension order but directed the respondent authorities to decide the petitioner’s representation dated 01.01.2020 via a speaking order on or before 30.06.2026.

The court held that if the authority finds merit, it shall revoke the suspension; otherwise, the petitioner remains free to challenge the decision in accordance with law. Rule was made absolute to this extent.