Courts Cannot Mandate Executive Policy Formulation or Direct Administrative Posting Decisions Ignoring Service Exigencies

The respondents are employees of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department (IA&AD), a subordinate office of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India (CAGI), who were posted on deputation at stations where their spouses were posted, or stations proximate thereto.

Pursuant to a deputation policy circulated by the CAGI's office under letter dated 27.01.2025 ("the 2025 Policy"), the respondents were, upon completion of seven years at their deputation stations, repatriated to their parent postings, resulting in separation from their spouses.

The respondents challenged the repatriation before the Central Administrative Tribunal ("the Tribunal") in a batch of Original Applications, which were allowed in part by judgment dated 15.04.2026.

The Tribunal disapproved the 2025 Policy, directed its reconsideration along specified lines, and further directed that the respondents be permitted to remain at their deputation postings pending such reconsideration.

During the pendency of the writ petitions, all respondents joined their parent postings, rendering the challenge to the repatriation orders infructuous.

Notably, the validity of the self-same 2025 Policy had previously been upheld by the Patna Bench of the Tribunal (decision dated 08.10.2025) and subsequently by the Jharkhand High Court in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 3603.

1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in disapproving the 2025 deputation policy and directing its reconsideration and modification along lines specified by the Tribunal itself.

2. Whether the Tribunal, being hierarchically subordinate to a High Court, could rule contrary to the judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey which had upheld the validity of the identical 2025 Policy, by merely observing that the "factual matrix" was "materially distinguishable".

3. Whether the Tribunal's direction to maintain status quo qua the respondents' deputation postings survived for consideration, given the respondents' subsequent repatriation.

The Court applied the settled principles of service jurisprudence that transfer is an incident of service; that an employee has no fundamental or vested right to a posting of choice; that executive instructions on transfers/postings confer no indefeasible right; and that spousal posting policies operate only "as far as practicable" and remain subject to administrative exigencies, as laid down in SK Nausad Rahaman v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 1, Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, (1992) 1 SCC 306, and Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357.

The Court further applied the doctrine of judicial discipline, holding that the Tribunal, being hierarchically lower than a High Court, cannot rule contrary to a High Court's judgment, and any attempt at distinguishing such a judgment must rest on "clear and cogent grounds, with clear and cogent reasons".

Additionally, the Court relied upon Union of India v. K. Pushpavanam, (2023) 20 SCC 736, State of J&K v. A.R. Zakki, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548, and Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187, for the proposition that no court can direct the executive to frame a policy, much less along lines specified by the court itself.

Declining to independently re-examine the 2025 Policy's validity, the Court expressed "entire agreement" with the Jharkhand High Court's reasoning in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey, extensively reproducing passages affirming that transfer is an incident of service and that inconvenience to an employee's family is insufficient cause for judicial interference.

The Court found the Tribunal's treatment of the Jharkhand High Court judgment unsatisfactory: the circumstances in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey were similar to those of the respondents, and the challenge to the very same 2025 Policy had failed both before the Patna Bench of the Tribunal and the Jharkhand High Court; consequently, the Tribunal's cursory observation that the "factual matrix" was "materially distinguishable," without cogent supporting reasons, was impermissible given that the Tribunal is hierarchically lower than a High Court.

The Court held that paragraph 72 of the Tribunal's judgment—wherein the Tribunal mandated a "comprehensive review," incorporation of DoPT spouse-posting guidelines "in their true letter and spirit," a transparent mechanism for relaxation of the seven-year cap, and a structured framework governing deputation extensions—travelled "far beyond the justifiable limits of its jurisdiction," since even assuming a recommendation for reconsideration were permissible, the Tribunal could not direct reconsideration on specified lines, nor frown upon a policy whose validity stood affirmed by a High Court.

Since the respondents had already been repatriated to their parent cadres, the Tribunal's status quo direction was held not to survive.

The Tribunal's direction to maintain status quo regarding the respondents' postings was held not to survive for consideration, the respondents having already been repatriated.

The Court reserved liberty in the respondents' favour to seek the benefit of the DoPT OM dated 30.09.2009 concerning spousal postings by approaching the petitioner, while expressly clarifying that no opinion was expressed on the availability of such benefit and that the respondents' rights would remain reserved should relief be refused.